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Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse 
Theory of Contractual Liability 
Nathan B. Oman 
ABSTRACT: In the ancient Near East, contracts were often solemnized by 
hacking up a goat. The ritual was an enacted penalty clause: “If I breach 
this contract, let it be done to me as we are doing to the goat.” This Article 
argues that we are not so far removed from our goat-hacking forbearers. 
Legal scholars have argued that contractual liability is best explained by the 
morality of promise making, or by the need to create optimal incentives in 
contractual performance. In contrast, this Article argues for the simpler, 
rawer claim that contractual liability consists of consent to retaliation in the 
event of breach. In the ancient ritual with the goat, the consented-to 
retaliation consisted of self-help violence against life and limb. The private 
law in effect domesticates and civilizes retaliation by replacing private 
warfare with civil recourse through the courts. It thus facilitates the social 
cooperation made possible by the ancient threats of retaliation, while 
avoiding the danger of escalation and violence that such private violence 
presented. This civil recourse theory of contractual liability provides an 
explanation for a number of remedial doctrines that have proven difficult 
for rival interpretations of contract law to explain—including the penalty-
clause doctrine, limitations on expectation damages, and the basic private-
law structure of contractual liability. Finally, this Article responds to some 
of the most powerful objections that might be made against a civil recourse 
theory of contractual liability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many of the earliest contracts were bloody affairs. Both Homer and the 
Bible recount covenant rituals in which promisors slaughtered animals and 
poured their blood on the ground to seal a bargain. In essence, these 
sanguinary rituals consisted of consent to retaliation in the event of breach. 
When promisors hacked up a goat, they consented to be hacked up in like 
manner should they breach. While the modern legal world seems very 
different from the violent one depicted in these ancient sources, this Article 
theorizes that contemporary contract law is much closer to these ancient 
covenant rituals than we suppose. Modern scholars have struggled to 
account for contractual liability in terms of the moral obligation to keep a 
promise, the need for incentives to promote optimal investment in contract 
performance, and other social goals.1 This Article argues in favor of a 
simpler, rawer claim: contractual liability consists of consent to retaliation in 
the event of breach. Of course, the retaliation consented to in a modern 
contract consists of recourse through the courts, rather than violence 
against life and limb. We moderns, however, are closer to our goat-hacking 
forbearers than we assume. 
This is an interpretive claim about contractual liability. The goal of such 
a theory is not to explain what contract law would look like in the best of all 
possible worlds. Rather, the goal is to reveal the normative structure of 
contractual liability as it currently exists. Such a theory can be valuable for a 
number of reasons. First, it increases our philosophical understanding of an 
important social practice. To the extent that we can show that our current 
law—or some portion of it—represents a set of coherent goals and choices 
rather than the outcome of essentially random historical accidents, we 
understand the law better. Second, to the extent that we believe that judges 
should decide cases according to preexisting legal rules, or should shift legal 
doctrine in ways that nevertheless retain continuity with previous law, we 
need an interpretive account of our law as it now stands. Finally, an 
understanding of the normative structure of our current law is important 
when we propose reforms to change it. Such proposals never exist in a 
vacuum, but must be measured against the value of our current law. To 
justify replacing current rules with something new, we must understand the 
values—if any—instantiated in our current law. Only then can we judge 
whether a proposed change will be an improvement. Understanding the 
 
 1. See, e.g., Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 24 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (summarizing contemporary debates over the theory 
of contract law); James Gordley, Contract, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 3 
(Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003) (same); Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687 (Jules Coleman & 
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (same). 
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normative foundations of our current law is thus an integral part of the way 
it, to use Lord Mansfield’s phrase, “works itself pure.”2 
I label the core interpretive claim of this Article—that contractual 
liability consists of consent to retaliation in the event of breach—the civil 
recourse theory. Civil recourse has been a much-discussed topic in the 
philosophy of tort law.3 In that context, civil recourse theorists have focused 
on the fact that at its core, private law empowers plaintiffs to act against 
defendants, rather than having the State step in as a third-party enforcer of 
some set of moral duties or as a provider of optimal economic incentives. 
This Article is the first attempt to articulate in detail a civil recourse theory 
of contractual liability. I label the theory offered here a civil recourse theory 
with the knowledge that there is some risk of confusion in terming it as such. 
The civil recourse theory of contractual liability shares with civil recourse 
accounts of tort law an emphasis on private law’s role as an empowerer of 
plaintiffs rather than an independent enforcer of norms. It also shares with 
these theories a sense that private law represents the civilization of earlier 
forms of violent self-help. Ultimately, however, this Article offers a different 
normative justification for civil recourse than those offered by tort theorists, 
and one that is less embarrassed about defending the virtues of private 
retaliation. 
We begin by setting forth the civil recourse theory with a stylized 
recreation of the progress from anarchic systems of contract enforcement to 
the contemporary common law of contracts. In ancient covenant rituals, 
parties consented to violent retaliation in the event of breach. Over time, 
this consent to violent retaliation was transformed into consent to the 
extraction of wealth through the courts. This can be seen most clearly in the 
penal bond, which was the dominant contractual mechanism for much of 
the common law’s history. Finally, as scholars of relational contracts have 
long pointed out, legal rights under contracts do not capture the full 
complexities of the relationship between the parties. In modern litigation, 
legal contracts function as weapons that can be used in the event of a 
 
 2. Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch.) 23; 1 Atk. 22, 34 (Lord 
Mansfield) (emphasis omitted). 
 3. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to 
a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) [hereinafter Goldberg, Constitutional 
Status]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003) 
[hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 1, at 623; Benjamin 
C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998); see also 
Alan Calnan, In Defense of the Liberal Justice Theory of Torts: A Reply to Professors Goldberg and 
Zipursky, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1023 (2005) (criticizing the theory); John Finnis, Natural Law: 
The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 
supra note 1, at 1 (same); Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursksy’s Civil Recourse Theory, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529 (2006) (same). For a summary of the debates from which their civil 
recourse theory of tort law emerged, see John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 
GEO. L.J. 513 (2003). 
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breakdown in relations between the parties. Modern parties understand that 
when they contract they do not simply define their reciprocal obligations. 
Rather, they make themselves vulnerable to attack via litigation in the event 
of breach. This historical foray suggests that consent to retaliation in the 
event of breach represents the deep structure of contractual liability. What 
began as a bloody system of violence and self-help has been civilized into a 
system of civil recourse through the courts. The basic structure, however, of 
consent to retaliation continues. 
From this interpretive claim, we turn to the normative case in favor of 
the civil recourse theory. Although not offered as a policy proposal, a 
successful interpretive argument should still present current law as at least 
normatively plausible. This Article frankly embraces the virtues of allowing 
retaliation. Providing recourse against contract breakers allows promisees to 
threaten retaliation in the event of breach. This threat, in turn, facilitates 
cooperation by reducing the problem of ex post opportunism. The insight 
here is tied to the basic understanding of executory contracts as presenting a 
prisoner’s dilemma. Contrary to the conventional story in the literature, this 
Article argues that contract law does not solve this problem through third-
party enforcement of contract obligations. Instead, by facilitating retaliation 
against breaching promisors by disappointed promisees, contract law allows 
contracting parties to credibly threaten defectors with personal retaliation. 
The civil recourse theory, though, is necessarily limited. It is only a theory of 
liability and remedies. It does not purport to be a complete justification of 
contract law. Indeed, the civil recourse theory suggests that a broader 
account of contract law will be necessarily pluralistic, resting on a number of 
normative concerns. 
The civil recourse theory does, however, shed light on some persistent 
puzzles in the remedial law of contracts. First, it views expectation damages 
as an upper limit on retaliation by plaintiffs against defendants, rather than 
as an optimal incentive for performance or as compensation for the value of 
a broken promise. Accordingly, the ubiquitous deviations from the strict 
expectation measure that we see in current doctrine are not troubling. One 
can accommodate pragmatic or efficiency concerns by limiting recovery 
without compromising the basic justification for contractual liability. In 
contrast, such limitations become problematic if damages are viewed 
through the lenses of rival theories—such as promissory morality or 
economic efficiency. Second, the rule against penalty clauses is awkward for 
both autonomy and efficiency theories, which see it as a suspicious limitation 
on contractual freedom. In contrast, the rule flows naturally from a recourse 
theory of contract, which seeks to limit plaintiffs’ rights of retaliation against 
defendants to a proportional or “civil” response. Third, civil recourse theory 
accounts for the basic private-law structure of contractual liability—
specifically, the bilateralism of contract damages and private standing. 
Bilateralism refers to the fact that damages are always paid from defendants 
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to plaintiffs, rather than as fines to the State. Private standing refers to the 
fact that rather than enforcing contractual obligations, the State waits for 
plaintiffs to initiate and control litigation. Both of these features are 
awkward for rival theories of contract, but flow naturally from the idea of 
civil recourse. 
The civil recourse theory is open to a number of objections. First, it 
seems to valorize revenge, which we usually regard as morally abhorrent. 
This objection, however, fails to differentiate between facilitating retaliation 
as a means of social ordering versus mere predation or retribution. Second, 
a civil recourse theory seems inconsistent with some of the language used by 
judges. An interpretive theory ought to take such language more seriously 
than the one presented here apparently does. This objection can be met by 
understanding the limited demands that judicial language places even on 
interpretive theories, as well as by explaining how judicial language is not as 
inconsistent with a civil recourse theory as one might assume. Finally, the 
rules regarding contract formation, particularly under American law, do not 
appear to turn on consent to recourse. The doctrines of consideration and 
promissory estoppel seem to pick out a class of agreements that, for 
whatever reason, are worthy of enforcement, regardless of whether the 
parties consent to recourse.4 Contract formation rules, however, can be seen 
as doing a rough and ready job of identifying agreements where parties 
would expect a promisee to claim a right of recourse upon default. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II sets out the interpretive claim 
that contractual liability consists of consent to recourse in the event of 
breach; Part III provides a normative argument in support of this 
interpretive claim, showing how facilitating retaliation can serve laudable 
social goals; Part IV extends the theory by showing its implications for some 
puzzles in contract doctrine; Part V responds to objections; and Part VI 
concludes. 
II. CONSENT AND CIVIL RECOURSE 
Contractual liability consists of consent by promisors to retaliation by 
promisees in the event of default. Put in starker terms, when you and I make 
 
 4. Indeed, consent to be legally bound is not an element of contract formation in the 
United States, and plays only a vestigial role in English and Commonwealth law. See 1 CHITTY 
ON CONTRACTS ¶ 2-153, at 198 (H.G. Beale et al. eds., 29th ed. 2004) (noting that English law 
requires an intention to be legally bound to form a contract). In actual fact, even under English 
law, the intent to be legally bound is the subject of a strong presumption, particularly in 
commercial contracts. See id. ¶ 2-154, at 199 (“In the case of ordinary commercial transactions 
it is not normally necessary to prove that the parties to an express agreement in fact intended to 
create legal relations.”). Thus, P.S. Atiyah insists that “[i]t is . . . more realistic to say that no 
positive intention to enter into legal relations needs to be shown.” P.S. ATIYAH, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 153 (5th ed. 1995). Indeed, so strong is the 
presumption that English courts have found a binding contract even where the promisor 
believed that his promise had no legal effect. Id. 
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a contract, I consent to your right to attack me if I breach. In support of this 
claim, we examine a highly stylized account of the rise of contract law, one 
that begins with ancient covenant rituals and shows the recourse theory of 
contract in its rawest form. This Article argues that while the methods and 
limits of legitimate recourse under current law are very different than those 
envisioned by these ancient rituals, the underlying logic of the relationship 
between promisor, promisee, and contract is the same. These historical 
examples are meant to offer an insight into the current structure of the law, 
rather than provide a complete account of its origins. A true history of 
contract would necessarily be more complex than what follows.5 The 
historical examples here are meant to bring to the surface the latent 
structure of our current law. 
A. CUTTING A COVENANT 
The fifteenth chapter of Genesis in the Bible records one of the most 
famous contracts in history. Abram (later renamed Abraham) has left his 
homeland in Ur and come to the land of Canaan. After defeating a coalition 
of local kings, Abram has a vision in which God promises the childless 
patriarch that his decedents will outnumber the stars of heaven and that he 
will inherit the land of Canaan. The skeptical Abram asks, “O Lord God, 
how am I to know that I shall possess it?”6 The text goes on: “[God] said to 
him, ‘Bring me a heifer three years old, a she-goat three years old, a ram 
three years old, a turtledove, and a young pigeon.’ And he brought him all 
these, cut them in two, and laid each half over against the other . . . .”7 It is, 
to modern ears, a strange story. Abram doubts God’s promise, but his doubts 
are allayed when God instructs him to dismember three animals. Why does 
the ritual with the mutilated livestock convince Abram that God’s promise is 
meant seriously? While the answer is obscure to us, it would have been 
apparent to an ancient reader. God’s response to Abram transforms his 
promise into a legal covenant by invoking the formality by which such 
covenants were created in the ancient Near East.8 
 
 5. See generally DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS (1999) (providing a history of the common law of contracts); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT (1975) 
(same). 
 6. Genesis 15:8 (RSV) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 7. Id. 15:9–10. 
 8. See ROBERT DAVIDSON, GENESIS 12–50, at 45 (1979) (“From the one other Old 
Testament reference (Jer. 34: 18–20) and extra-biblical parallels, it seems that the rite was a 
form of dramatized curse. The parties as they walked between the severed halves were in effect 
saying, ‘May God do so to me if I violate this solemn agreement.’”); ZE’EV W. FALK, HEBREW LAW 
IN BIBLICAL TIMES 89 (2d ed. 2001) (“[I]n the patriarchal age the parties used to kill an animal 
as a sign of the punishment to befall the person who broke the covenant.”). 
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The slaughter of the heifer and the she-goat was an enacted penalty 
clause.9 In effect, the parties to a covenant agreed that, in the event that they 
failed to fulfill their part of the bargain, they should be treated in the same 
manner as the dismembered animals. Indeed, in Biblical Hebrew one does 
not “make a covenant.” The phrase is translated more literally as to “cut a 
covenant.”10 The formality of killing an animal to seal a deal was widespread 
in the ancient world—appearing, for example, in Babylonian treaties, and 
the agreement dividing Alexander the Great’s empire upon his death where 
his generals hacked up a dog.11 Thomas Hobbes notes the form in 
Leviathan, writing that, “before the time of Civill Society . . . there is nothing 
can strengthen a Covenant of Peace . . . but . . . [the] Feare as a Revenger of 
their perfidy. . . . Such was the Heathen Forme, Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill 
this Beast.”12 
In part, as Hobbes noted, the ritual invoked the punishment of the gods 
(an ironic position for the militantly monotheistic Yahweh to take in Genesis 
15), but it also may have been embedded in a system of self-help. The 
relationship is nicely captured in Book III of The Iliad when Priam, the King 
of Troy, and Agamemnon, leader of the besieging Achaeans, agree to end 
their war through single combat between champions from either side. They 
formalize the agreement by slitting the throats of a brace of sheep and 
pouring their blood, along with wine, on the ground as a libation to the 
gods. The Trojans and Achaeans then join in a prayer: “Zeus—god of 
greatness, god of glory, all you immortals! Whichever contenders trample on 
this treaty first, spill their brains on the ground as this wine spills—theirs, 
their children’s too—their enemies rape their wives!”13 Notice the prayer 
invokes not only the wrath of the gods, but also suggests the legitimacy of 
violence against oath breakers and their families.14 In an anarchic world of 
 
 9. Genesis 15:8 (RSV). 
 10. See 7 THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 351 (G. Johannes Botterweck 
et al. eds., David E. Green trans., 1995) (discussing the meaning of the Hebrew term “karat” in 
the context of covenant making). 
 11. See L. ELLIOTT BINNS, THE BOOK OF THE PROPHET JEREMIAH 262 n.19 (1919) 
(discussing the dismembering of the dog among Alexander the Great’s generals); BRUCE 
VAWTER, ON GENESIS: A NEW READING 211–12 (1977) (providing the Babylonian examples). 
 12. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 99 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) 
(1651). 
 13. HOMER, THE ILIAD 138 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books 1990) (c. 800 B.C.E.). 
 14. Charles Fensham describes the legitimacy of violence following breach: 
On a breach of covenant punishment must follow. The curses of the gods in the 
extrabiblical material is a deterrent, but not an actual punishment. . . . [D]irect 
punishment on the breach of covenant [as opposed to a lawsuit] is probably the 
only one which could have been used by Near Eastern kings . . . . 
F. Charles Fensham, Malediction and Benediction in Ancient Near Eastern Vassal-Treaties and the Old 
Testament, 33 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE ALTTESTAMENTLICHE WISSENSCHAFT (n.s.) 1, 7–8 (1962) 
(Ger.). 
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feuding tribes, this ex ante authorization would have been particularly 
important because it would allow a disappointed promisee to exact 
vengeance on a promisor without fear of retaliation by members of the 
promisor’s tribe.15 
If the ancient sources valorize the right of private retaliation without 
ambivalence, they also show an interest in limiting retaliation. The most 
famous example of this concern is found in the Bible. According to the Book 
of Exodus, the divine law delivered to Moses at Sinai declared: “When men 
strive together . . . . [i]f any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye 
for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound 
for wound, stripe for stripe.”16 Hence, retaliation was limited by some 
principle of proportionality. To take more than an eye for an eye was to 
engage in predation. According to the Talmud, the bloody, but limited, 
retaliation sanctioned by the lex talionis was then converted into the payment 
of money.17 Likewise, the earliest Germanic and Anglo-Saxon laws contained 
a schedule of wergild that might be proffered in lieu of blood feud.18 Indeed, 
according to nineteenth-century historians, private law itself emerged from 
attempts to limit the violence of feuding tribes. “Step by step, as the power of 
the State waxes,” wrote Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, 
“the self-centred and self-helping autonomy of the kindred wanes. Private 
feud is controlled, regulated, put, one may say, into legal harness . . . .”19 
B. PENAL BONDS 
Although in early English law the “law of contract [was] rudimentary, so 
rudimentary as to be barely distinguishable from the law of property,” it is 
possible to discern the successive limitations on earlier forms of self-help 
 
 15. Indeed, the Bible records at least one case in which a promisor explicitly agreed to 
violence by the promisee in the event of breach. During the invasion of Canaan recounted in 
the Book of Joshua, the Israelites send two spies into the city of Jericho, where they are hidden 
and assisted by a prostitute named Rahab. Rahab and the spies exchange oaths, but the spies 
insist that “if you tell this business of ours, then we shall be guiltless with respect to your oath 
which you have made us swear,” meaning that when the Israelites sacked the city they would be 
within their rights to kill Rahab and her family. Joshua 2:20 (RSV) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 16. Exodus 21:22–25 (RSV). 
 17. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 63–68 (2006) (discussing rabbinic 
interpretation of the lex talionis). 
 18. See 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 47–48 (2d ed. rev. 1968) (1895) (discussing wergild and 
composition in early Anglo-Saxon law). 
 19. Id. at 31. Modern historians have questioned the seemingly neat narrative of organic 
progression put forward by Pollock and Maitland, noting that litigation coexisted in many early 
societies less as a substitute for the blood feud than as alternative mode of attack in the conflict 
between persons and clans. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 17, at 119–21. But see POLLOCK & 
MAITLAND, supra note 18, at 47 (noting that feud and “the semi-judicial arbitration of wise 
men” coexisted in medieval Iceland). 
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that we see so clearly with the rise of wergild and the decline of feuds.20 
Given the circumstances of early English law, the surviving codes are 
concerned mainly with claims arising out of violent confrontations21—what 
we would classify today as torts.22 Later, the embryonic common law devoted 
most of its attention to questions revolving around property in land.23 
Nevertheless, in the arena of contract, we see a similar move to civilize 
recourse by transforming claims to exact violent retribution into claims for 
cash and by replacing self-help with adjudication. 
In telling this story, we turn from the bloody world of “cutting 
covenants” to the less exotic penal bond, which was the dominant form of 
contracting for much of the common law’s history.24 The English borrowed 
the mechanism from the Romans. The earliest source of Roman law, the 
Twelve Tables, operated in a world where adjudication coexisted with self-
help violence.25 A debtor who failed to pay on a debt, for example, could be 
bound in the marketplace.26 “After the third market day,” the Tables cold-
bloodedly continued, “let the debtor’s body . . . be cut up in pieces. If the 
parts are greater or less than they should be, no liability will be entailed.”27 
The mature Roman law replaced the forum’s bloody ritual with contracts 
under which a promisor simply agreed to the payment of a sum as 
punishment in the event of breach.28 The medieval common law adopted 
this device as the penal bond.29 It took the form of a deed in which a 
promisor confessed a debt to the promisee—in effect creating a status-based 
relationship of creditor and promisor.30 The deed was put in writing and 
 
 20. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 18, at 43. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. at 44–45. 
 23. See generally id. at 1–28 (describing the evolution of rights in land). 
 24. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 368–71 (4th ed. 2002). 
 25. See generally ALAN WATSON, ROME OF THE XII TABLES: PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1975). 
 26. See Twelve Tables, in THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN 579, 579 (T. Lambert 
Mears trans., Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons 1994) (1882) (setting forth rules for commencing a 
lawsuit). 
 27. Id. at 581. 
 28. See DIG. 44.7.44 (Paul, Ad Edictum Praetoris 74) (“If I have stipulated as follows: ‘Do 
you promise to give a hundred if you have not transferred the land?’ Only the hundred is part 
of the stipulation, but the land serves for its discharge.”). 
 29. See Joseph Biancalana, The Development of the Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance, 26 J. 
LEGAL HIST. 103, 103–06 (2005) (discussing the influence of Roman law on early common-law 
penal bonds). 
 30. Judge (then Professor) Morris Sheppard Arnold nicely summarizes the status of debt 
in the early common law of contracts: 
[I]nstead of saying a defendant promised to pay money, a plaintiff could claim that 
he owed it. This is what the writ of debt said simply—debet, he, the defendant, owes. 
The writ always was general, although the facts of the transaction giving rise to the 
duty to pay would be given in the plaintiff’s declaration. A duty to pay money might 
arise (a writ of debt might work) in a great miscellany of situations, most of them 
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sealed by the debtor.31 The bond, however, would contain a condition 
relieving the promisor of the obligation to pay.32 For example, A would 
execute a bond confessing a debt of £100 in a year’s time to B. Noted on the 
reverse of the bond, would be a condition relieving A of the obligation to 
pay if he conveyed Blackacre to B first. The intention of the parties, of 
course, was to transfer Blackacre rather than the £100. The bond’s purpose 
was to give B the ability to exact a penalty from A in the event that A failed to 
keep this promise to convey Blackacre. Strictly speaking, the bond contained 
no legally recognized promise by A to transfer Blackacre. Any such promise 
existed only as an extra-legal undertaking by A. 
In structure, the penal bond was similar to the covenant ritual of 
hacking up a goat. Under both devices, the parties, ex ante, created a system 
of recourse against a promisor who breached ex post. The goal was to 
provide an in terrorem incentive to perform by giving the promisee a means 
of retaliating in the event of breach, while limiting the possibility of 
escalation. In the case of Priam and Agamemnon, the Trojans and Achaeans 
sought to authorize attacks against breachers that would not lead to a 
resumption of the all-out war they were attempting to limit.33 As the 
subsequent story of The Iliad shows, they were ultimately unsuccessful, in 
part because the violence of the remedy rapidly escalated.34 The penal bond 
avoided this problem by eliminating private violence altogether. Initially, 
however, the financial scope of the penalty that the promisee could extract 
in the event of breach remained largely unregulated. 
This shifted in the seventeenth century. Defendants began resorting to 
the equity courts, claiming that the penalty due under the bond was 
excessive in light of the value of the failed condition. For example, in the 
1671 case of Wilson v. Barton, the litigants in an ecclesiastical court agreed to 
submit their dispute to a secular court and executed a £200 penalty bond to 
secure the contract.35 When the plaintiff refused to submit the case as 
 
consensual. So if a person admitted a debt in a sealed writing—by executing a 
scriptum obligatorium, a bond—then a writ claiming that the person debet the obligee 
named (or his attorney) would work. The liability arose not because the obligor 
impliedly promised to pay, as we ourselves would say, but because he admitted he 
owed. The instrument was an I.O.U., not a promissory note, and the writ was said 
to be “on the obligation” (sur obligation). 
Morris S. Arnold, Transcending Covenant and Debt, 85 YALE L.J. 990, 992 (1974) (reviewing 
SIMPSON, supra note 5). 
 31. See BAKER, supra note 24, at 368; SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 91; Biancalana, supra note 
29, at 107. 
 32. See BAKER, supra note 24, at 368; SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 91; Biancalana, supra note 
29, at 103. 
 33. HOMER, supra note 13, at 138. 
 34. See id. at 145–63. 
 35. (1671–1672) 21 Eng. Rep. 812 (Ch.) 812; Nelson 148. 
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agreed, the defendant sued on the bond at common law.36 The plaintiff 
then petitioned the equity court for relief, “[w]hereupon the Master of the 
Rolls granted an Injunction against the Penalty, and directed a Tryal to try 
what the Defendants were damnified by the Countermand.”37 In another 
case involving a complex marriage contract secured by a £3000 penalty 
bond, the equity court declared they “saw no Colour of Cause to give the 
said Plaintiff any Relief against the said £3000 Bond and Judgment thereon 
had, other than against the Penalty.”38 
Ultimately, Parliament sided with the equity courts in a series of laws 
passed at the turn of the eighteenth century. The initial procedure adopted 
by Parliament suggests an attempt to limit retaliation through the legal 
system, rather than an attempt to substitute compensation for penalty. 
Hence, under a 1696 statute, a plaintiff suing upon a bond was allowed to 
execute on property only up to the value of the damages suffered as a result 
of breach. 
[B]ut notwithstanding, in each case such judgement shall remaine 
continue and be as a further security to answer to the plaintiffe or 
plaintiffs and his or their executors or administrators such damages 
as shall or may be sustained for further breach of any covenant or 
covenants in the same indenture deed or writing . . . .39 
Only a decade later, Parliament acted to make payment of damages a full 
substitute for the stipulated penalty under the bond.40 The penal bond 
continued as a popular transactional form for another century and a half, 
mainly because of procedural advantages—such as a longer statute of 
limitations—for actions on specialty contracts like bonds, vis-à-vis simple 
contracts.41 Following the limitations of the early eighteenth century, 
regardless of the penalty specified in the bond, the value of the underlying 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Hodkin v. Blackman, (1674–1675) 21 Eng. Rep. 628 (Ch.) 629; 2 Chan. Rep. 103, 
104. 
 39. Administration of Justice Act, 1696, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 11, § VIII (Eng.). 
 40. The amended law stated: 
[I]f at any time pending an action upon any such bond with a penalty the 
defendant shall bring into [the] court where the action shall be depending all the 
principal money and interest due on such bond and also all such costs as have 
been expended in any suit or suits in law or equity upon such bond the said money 
so brought in shall be deemed and taken to be in full satisfaction and discharge of 
the said bond and the court shall and may give judgment to discharge every such 
defendant of and from the same accordingly. 
Administration of Justice Act, 1705, 4 & 5 Ann., c. 3, § XIII (Eng.). 
 41. See BAKER, supra note 24, at 325–26; SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 125; Biancalana, supra 
note 29, at 113. 
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promise represented a ceiling on the plaintiff’s recourse against the 
defendant.42 
C. RECOURSE AND MODERN LITIGATION 
Despite the apparent distance between the worlds of ancient covenants 
or penal bonds and modern contract litigation, the notion of contractual 
liability as consent to retaliation fits comfortably within modern commercial 
practices. Relational contract theorists have long noted the apparent 
disjunction between contract doctrine and the actual practices of 
contracting parties.43 Contract lawyers often speak as though contracts 
specify the obligations of parties over the course of a deal, guiding their 
behavior.44 But in practice, formal legal contracts often have little to do with 
the complex process of cooperation and mutual accommodation that 
characterizes actual business practice.45 Rather, contracts are important not 
because they govern the terms of the deal, but because they function as the 
basis for litigation in the event of a breakdown in the relationship between 
the parties. Lisa Bernstein, for example, has shown how businesspeople 
operate under two distinct sets of norms.46 Relationship-maintaining norms 
govern ongoing business relationships and are characterized by the informal 
 
 42. See BAKER, supra note 24, at 325; SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 122; Biancalana, supra note 
29, at 111. 
 43. Ian Macneil notes: 
[A]ll the standard texts on English law reflect a notion that the law of contract 
litigation is a relatively neat and logical structure of rules. [I] believe[] this idea to 
be inaccurate . . . Contract law is hardly a neat and logical structure of rules, but 
like all law a social instrument designed to accomplish the goals of man. 
IAN MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 6 
(David Campbell ed., 2001) (quoting IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: INSTRUMENTS FOR SOCIAL 
COOPERATION: EAST AFRICA (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stewart Macaulay, 
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 64 (1963) (“Some 
businessmen object that in such a carefully worked out relationship one gets performance only 
to the letter of the contract. Such planning indicates a lack of trust and blunts the demands of 
friendship, turning a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse trade.”). 
 44. Renaud v. Simmons, 254 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (“The contract 
specifies the obligations of the parties in detail.”); MACNEIL, supra note 43, at 130–31 (“Thus, 
the first two elements of promise in its contractual context are the wills of two or more 
individuals with beliefs in the power of one to affect the future—subject to the linkage of the 
social matrix essential to exchange.”). 
 45. Stewart Macaulay describes this reality: 
[The lawyers] complained that businessmen desire to “keep it simple and avoid red 
tape” even where large amounts of money and significant risks are involved. One 
stated that he was “sick of being told, ‘We can trust old Max,’ when the problem is 
not one of honesty but one of reaching an agreement that both sides understand.” 
Macaulay, supra note 43, at 58–59. 
 46. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796 (1996) (describing the difference 
between relationship-preserving norms and end-game norms). 
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accommodation and cooperation observed by relational contract theorists.47 
End-game norms come into play when ongoing relationships have broken 
down.48 It is at this point, according to Bernstein, that parties invoke their 
formal contract rights.49 Put in starker terms, formal contracts often 
function less as guides for cooperation than as weapons to be used when 
cooperation breaks down. 
This vision of modern practice is consistent with the core structure at 
work in the ancient covenant rituals and the penal bond. In both cases, the 
formal contract exists to specify the conditions under which a promisee may 
retaliate against a wayward promisor. Likewise, modern practice suggests 
that it is quite reasonable to suppose that in many—or indeed most—cases, 
legal contracts exist mainly to facilitate retaliation in the event that relations 
between the parties break down. The contract does more than this, however. 
It also radically constrains the ability to retaliate in the end game, by 
specifying the conditions under which A may proceed against B, and by 
limiting the mode of retaliation to litigation. Furthermore, while speaking of 
litigation as a form of attack on a defendant’s wealth, or as retaliation by a 
disappointed promisee, may seem odd, it captures an important reality of 
modern law. People experience litigation as an aggressive action. Indeed, 
military metaphors abound in discussions of litigation.50 Much of this, of 
course, can be dismissed as lawyerly machismo. Nevertheless, the rhetoric 
persists because it comports with the inevitably antagonistic and aggressive 
nature of litigation. When A sues B for breach of contract, he or she makes a 
 
 47. Id. (defining relationship-preserving norms as “the norms that transactors choose to 
follow when they cooperatively resolve disputes among themselves and want to preserve their 
relationship”). 
 48. Id. (noting that end-game norms are “the norms that transactors would want a third-
party neutral to apply in a situation where they were unable to cooperatively resolve a dispute 
and viewed their relationship as being at an end-game stage”). 
 49. As Professor Bernstein notes: 
[M]erchants behave in ways that reflect an implicit understanding of the 
distinction between end-game and relationship-preserving norms and . . . they do 
not necessarily want the RPNs they follow during the cooperative phase of their 
relationship to be used to resolve disputes when their relationship is at an end-
game stage. 
Id. at 1798. 
 50. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 542 (1991) (plurality opinion) 
(“fight their own battles by litigating before victory was certain”); Torres-Rosario v. United 
States, Civil No. 07-1282, 2010 WL 174884, at *4 (D.P.R. Jan. 13, 2010) (“Petitioner was faced 
with a seemingly uphill battle at trial.”); OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Parker, Kern, Nard & Wenzel, 
No. 1:09-cv-00257 AWI GSA, 2009 WL 2914203, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2009) (“Defendant 
moved to stay the instant action, asserting that it will be required to ‘fight a two-front litigation 
war’ because Plaintiff here seeks to adjudicate facts that are the subject of the underlying 
action . . . .”); Lock v. Encompass Ins. Co., No. 07-CV-14257, 2009 WL 804151, at *1 (E.D. 
Mich. Mar. 25, 2009) (“During the trial, a battle of the experts ensued.”); Peavey Elecs. Corp. v. 
Baan U.S.A., Inc., 07-CA-00341-COA (¶ 8), 10 So. 3d 945, 950 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (en banc) 
(“[f]ollowing what the trial court described as an ‘all out war’ of litigation”). 
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decision to attack B through the courts, and one will be hard-pressed to find 
a defendant who does not experience litigation as a form of attack. In this 
sense, modern litigants are much like the Trojans and Achaeans who battled 
before Illium in the wake of Agamemnon’s broken covenant. 
At this point, we can formulate the central interpretive claim of this 
Article: Contractual liability consists of ex ante consent to retaliation in the 
event of breach—a retaliation limited and civilized through litigation. The 
evolution of contract from the bloody enacted penalty clause of the ancient 
covenant ritual to the written penalty clause of the penal bond, and then to 
a limited claim for money damages, casts remedy for breach of contract in a 
new light. What we see is a gradual limiting of the scope of retaliation in the 
event of breach. Among the Trojans and Achaeans, a breach of covenant 
gave rise to the right to brutally attack the breaching party and his family. 
With the rise of more powerful legal systems, the right of personal recourse 
was replaced with a right to proceed against a breaching party in the courts. 
The claim of violent retaliation was replaced with a claim for money, 
although initially a promisor faced few ex ante limitations on what sort of 
financial recourse he could consent to in the event of breach. The rise of 
adjudication merely ruled out ex ante consent to violence and replaced it 
with consent to a claim for money. 
We then see a second process by which the intensity of the recourse was 
further limited. In effect, equity and Parliament ruled that any response 
prosecuted in the courts could not exceed the value of the bargain lost as a 
result of breach. Put another way, rather than seeking to enforce contracts, 
contract law in effect continues the ancient ritual of the dismembered goats, 
albeit in a civilized and limited form. It replaces the anarchic world of 
violence and feuds with a controlled world of civil recourse through the 
courts. 
III. JUSTIFYING CIVIL RECOURSE 
This account of contractual liability is an interpretive theory. It seeks to 
uncover something important about the underlying structure of the law that 
we currently have and is not offered as a model of what contract law would 
be if all was for the best in the “best of all possible worlds.”51 Rather, it has 
the more modest goal of revealing an aspect of the underlying normative 
logic of the law. An interpretive theory necessarily must pay attention to the 
normative logic of the law. Accordingly, it must also examine the extent to 
which the law is justified. Some theorists—most dramatically Ronald 
Dworkin—claim that a proper understanding of the law must present it as 
 
 51. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE OR OPTIMISM 130 (Burton Raffel trans., Yale Univ. Press 2005) 
(1759) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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justified by the best possible moral argument.52 Even if one adopts a less 
exalted view of the moral possibilities of legal interpretation, a successful 
interpretive theory will reveal the law as at least morally plausible.53 
Accordingly, this Part puts forward an argument that is meant to justify a 
consent to retaliation in the event of breach. 
The civil recourse theory sees contract law as facilitating a form of 
limited retaliation against breaching parties. While “attack” and “retaliation” 
may initially raise moral hackles, ultimately allowing retaliation against 
contract breachers is a valuable way to facilitate social cooperation. This 
justification for civil recourse, however, is necessarily limited. Indeed, to the 
extent that the normative and interpretive case for the civil recourse theory 
is successful, it suggests that any comprehensive account of contract law will 
necessarily be pluralistic, calling on normative concepts beyond those 
embodied in the idea of civil recourse. The civil recourse theory provides an 
account of contractual liability and contract remedies; it cannot account for 
a host of doctrines such as mistake or the statute of frauds, which necessarily 
embody other normative concerns. 
A. THE CASE FOR RETALIATION 
In the philosophy of tort law, civil recourse theory has been justified by 
appeal to a Lockean social contract in which a citizen retains a limited 
version of his natural right of “appropriating to himself, the Goods or 
Service of the Offender.”54 Because the view of contractual liability offered 
here shares with these tort theories an emphasis on a plaintiff’s ability to act 
against a defendant through the courts, it seems fair to label it a civil 
recourse theory. Such a label, though, carries with it a risk of confusion 
because the argument offered for the theory’s application to contractual 
liability rests on a very different normative basis than does the theory as 
applied to tort law. To understand those differences, it is useful to begin not 
with John Locke’s vision of the state of nature, but with the view offered up 
by Thomas Hobbes.55 
 
 52. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1997) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE] 
(laying out Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity at greater length); RONALD DWORKIN, Hard 
Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1978) (“I propose . . . the thesis that judicial decisions 
in civil cases . . . characteristically are and should be generated by principle and not policy.”). 
 53. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 13–24 (2004) (discussing strong, moderate, 
and weak versions of the justification requirement for theories of contract law). 
 54. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285, 
292 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1970) (1689); see supra note 3 and accompanying 
text. 
 55. To be clear, I am not trying to offer a Hobbesian theory of civil recourse in contrast to 
the Lockean theory put forward by Professors Zipursky and Goldberg. I begin with Hobbes 
because of the hold that his vision of anarchy has exercised on our thinking, not because my 
theory rests on the particular account of natural law and natural rights set forth in Hobbes’s The 
Leviathan. 
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Hobbes famously claimed that life in the state of nature was “solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”56 By the “state of nature,” Hobbes meant a 
world without formal government. His solution to the miserable brutishness 
of anarchy was Leviathan, an all-powerful State that could compel obedience 
to law.57 The alternative to Leviathan, he insisted, was chaos.58 Few thinkers 
today endorse Hobbes’s frank embrace of absolutism, although a strong 
assumption continues that Hobbes was correct about anarchy: In the 
absence of the State, chaos results.59 History and anthropology, however, 
reveal that Hobbes was mistaken on this crucial point. As an empirical 
matter, anarchic systems are not chaotic. Rather, they are filled with social 
practices that constrain conflict, violence, and predation. The State simply is 
not the only solution to the Hobbesian problem of man’s constant 
“endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other.”60 
For example, one of the most common mechanisms for creating order 
in an anarchic system is the feud.61 If a member of tribe A harms a member 
of tribe B, then members of tribe B will retaliate against a member of tribe A. 
This creates incentives for members of both tribes to avoid predation and to 
police misconduct by members of their own tribe. Admittedly, the order 
provided by such a system is brittle and can result in a cycle of violence that 
is difficult to escape. Most of the time, though, it does not break down. 
Indeed, as opposed to the rude and vicious anarchy predicted by Hobbes, in 
many societies where feuds govern, elaborate courtesy and hospitality are 
the norm.62 
Human flourishing, however, requires more than simply the absence of 
predation. It also requires that individuals cooperate with one another. In 
Hobbes’s vision of the state of nature, anyone foolish enough to enter a 
contract makes himself vulnerable to opportunism: 
 
 56. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 89. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. An example of this presumption’s hold is expressed by the Tenth Circuit: 
To empower each individual to decide whether the particular law is worthy or runs 
against the individual’s private beliefs would necessarily produce a lawless society 
and chaos. Quite apart from the fact of invalidity of such a system, it has no 
practical social value. Such a government would fail in a very short time, for carried 
to its logical conclusion it is anarchy and revolution. 
United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 241 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 60. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 87. 
 61. See generally M.J.L. HARDY, BLOOD FEUDS AND THE PAYMENT OF BLOOD MONEY IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST (1963) (discussing Arab society’s longstanding customs following instances of 
violent death or injury). 
 62. See FRANK HENDERSON STEWART, HONOR 88–90 (1994) (discussing the obligations that 
honor culture of the Bedouins imposed on hosts to defend their guests against hostility and 
contrasting it with early European norms). 
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For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will 
performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridel 
mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the 
feare of some coërcive Power; which in the condition of meer 
Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of 
their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed.63 
In a world of simultaneous exchange, of course, contracts are not really 
necessary.64 Quid is exchanged for quo, but there is never an executory 
obligation to deliver quid or perform quo.65 As soon as the element of time 
is introduced, however, the problem becomes more complicated. 
Consider an example from Roman history. In 73 B.C.E., Spartacus, a 
gladiatorial slave in Capua, led a revolt in which he killed his owner.66 Other 
slaves rallied to his cause, and in a short time, he commanded an army of 
several thousand soldiers.67 Over a three-year period, Spartacus’s forces 
marched from one end of the Italian peninsula to the other, defeating the 
Roman legions sent to suppress the revolt.68 Finally, Spartacus was cornered 
at Rhegium in the toe of the Italian boot.69 Without a navy, he contracted 
with Cilician pirates, who promised to ferry the escaped slaves out of Italy in 
exchange for a share of the vast booty of Spartacus’s army.70 Plutarch 
records that “after the pirates had struck a bargain with him, and received 
his earnest, they deceived him and sailed away.”71 Trapped, the Romans 
captured the Spartacan army, and the consul Marcus Licinius Crassus lined 
the whole of the Via Appia between Capua and Rome with their crucified 
bodies.72 
 
 63. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 96. 
 64. In subsistence economies without common exchanges, however, the social practice of 
agreement and trade can be underdeveloped to a surprising degree. In early medieval Iceland, 
William Miller writes of “how difficult it might be, in the absence of a market economy and its 
accompanying mercantile assumptions, to transact without ill-feeling.” WILLIAM IAN MILLER, 
BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND 84 (1990). 
 65. Of course, this is an oversimplification. Even in a world of purely simultaneous 
exchange, disputes can arise out of agreements. For example, if Able exchanges a widget with 
Baker for cash, and the widget subsequently proves defective, Baker may complain to Able. 
Some mechanism would be necessary to resolve their dispute. Even in a world of caveat emptor, 
we would need some rule to tell us that caveat emptor is the standard. 
 66. See generally BARRY STRAUSS, THE SPARTACUS WAR (2009) (chronicling the story of the 
gladiator Spartacus who led a slave rebellion in ancient Rome). 
 67. Id. at 42–43. 
 68. Id. at 110. 
 69. Id. at 132. 
 70. Id. at 133–34. 
 71. 3 PLUTARCH, The Life of Crassus, in PLUTARCH’S LIVES 204, 214 (A.H. Clough ed., John 
Dryden trans., Cosimo, Inc. 2008) (c. 75 C.E.). 
 72. SANDRA R. JOSHEL, SLAVERY IN THE ROMAN WORLD 63 (2010). 
A3 - OMAN.DOC 12/15/2010  9:24 PM 
2011] CONSENT TO RETALIATION 547 
Contrary to Hobbes’s claim, there are many ways to solve this problem 
without an omnipotent Leviathan.73 In the absence of the State, cooperation 
can occur. Norms of reciprocity offer one solution.74 For example, the 
Algonquin tribes of northeastern America developed an elaborate system of 
customs by which those with personal abundance had an obligation to share 
their abundance with family, fellow tribe members, and allies.75 The 
recipients of this largess were in turn expected to share out of their 
abundance in the future.76 Those who failed to comply with these 
reciprocity norms undermined the cohesion and unity of clan and tribe 
relationships to the detriment of all of the parties involved.77 
Another solution developed in medieval Iceland, where the opposite of 
a reciprocity norm occurred.78 Warriors would engage in raids—rán—in 
which they would take property from one another.79 The expectation was 
that a rán would give rise to either a proportional counter-raid or litigation, 
in which the victim of the original rán would demand payment.80 Over time, 
a system of exchange, albeit without initial consent, formed.81 Another 
naturally occurring strategy encouraging cooperation is the social ostracism 
of promise breakers. For example, in the eleventh century, the Maghribi 
 
 73. See generally Joseph M. Perillo, Exchange, Contract and Law in the Stone Age, 31 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 17 (1989) (discussing mechanisms used by stateless societies to enforce agreements and 
facilitate exchange and cooperation). 
 74. See generally JACQUES T. GODBOUT IN COLLABORATION WITH ALAIN CAILLE, THE WORLD 
OF THE GIFT (Donald Winkler trans., 1998) (discussing the gift’s role in creating social 
connections that encourages the recipient to respond in kind); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE 
FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 
1990) (1950) (same); MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS (Routledge 2004) (1972) 
(discussing the economical implications of gifts during the Stone Age). 
 75. Richard White describes this system: 
Each recipient [of a gift] incurred a reciprocal obligation to the giver thus 
ensuring that goods were constantly in motion. Defining what were surplus goods 
in this situation—goods beyond the basic needs for subsistence and production—is 
difficult, since groups, not individuals, accumulated goods, and possession was so 
fluid. 
RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES 
REGION, 1650–1815, at 101–02 (1995). 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. at 101 (“The distribution of goods created obligation and established status, but 
here, in extending alliances and social relationships, Potawatomi leaders neglected existing 
internal obligations and eventually fragmented their villages and clans.”). 
 78. See MILLER, supra note 64, at 84–93 (discussing a case of exchange of resources 
through a process of rán, counter rán, and litigation). 
 79. See id. at 77, 83, 85–86. 
 80. See id. at 89–91. 
 81. See id. at 93–102 (discussing the norms governing raiding in medieval Iceland); see also 
JAMES F. BROOKS, CAPTIVES & COUSINS: SLAVERY, KINSHIP, AND COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST 
BORDERLANDS 3–40 (2002) (arguing that a similar system of limited and quasi-legitimate 
raiding existed among American Indian tribes in what became the southwestern United States). 
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(Jewish merchants in the Islamic lands of the Mediterranean) developed an 
elaborate system of collective shunning to deal with commercial 
misbehavior.82 Hostage taking, a standard method of increasing compliance 
with ancient treaties, offers yet another solution.83 None of these systems 
rely on a Hobbesian Leviathan to provide order and trust. 
Notwithstanding such mechanisms, the fate of the Spartacan army 
illustrates how any agreement involving executory obligations makes one or 
both of the contracting parties vulnerable.84 It leaves both in a classic 
prisoner’s dilemma.85 In its simplest form, the prisoner’s dilemma explains 
how rationally self-interested parties will always choose to defect, leaving 
everyone worse off than they would be in a world where cooperation is 
possible.86 Traditionally, scholars have looked to law as a solution to the 
dilemma.87 If we have contract law, so goes the argument, Able needn’t 
worry about Baker’s defection because once Baker enters into a legally 
binding contract, the law will prohibit his defection. This explanation 
assumes, however, that contract law enforces contracts—which is not quite 
true. The State leaves the question of legal action entirely in the hands of 
 
 82. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The 
Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 528–31 (1993) (discussing the mechanisms 
by which long-distance merchants managed the problem of embezzlement by distant agents). 
 83. See JOEL ALLEN, HOSTAGES AND HOSTAGE-TAKING IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE (2006) 
(discussing hostage taking in the ancient world); A.D. Lee, The Role of Hostages in Roman 
Diplomacy with Sasanian Persia, 40 HISTORIA: ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ALTE GESCHICHTE 366 (1991) 
(Ger.) (discussing hostage taking in international diplomacy in the ancient world); M. James 
Moscovich, Obsidibus Traditis: Hostages in Caesar’s De Bello Gallico, 75 CLASSICAL J. 122 (1979) 
(discussing hostage taking as a means of treaty enforcement during Caesar’s Gallic campaigns). 
 84. See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 491–93 (2005) 
(discussing the problem of ex post opportunism in contracting). 
 85. See AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF 
GOVERNANCE 14–15 (2004) (discussing the famous hold-up problem faced in executory 
contracts). As Dixit notes, “This is like a prisoner’s dilemma except that only the second player 
has the opportunity to make an extra private gain, therefore it is often called a one-sided 
prisoner’s dilemma.” Id. at 16. 
 86. See id. at 15 (“[I]n the normal form, (Don’t Invest, Hold Up) is the only Nash 
equilibrium; for any other strategy combination, one of the players wants to deviate to a 
different strategy.”). 
 87. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
293, 312 (1992) (“The prisoners’ dilemma is simply a situation in which the costs of bargaining 
or of enforcing the resulting contract are very high.”); D.K. Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 AM. 
ECON. REV. 835, 836 (1976) (“A prisoners’ dilemma can be resolved satisfactorily by an 
enforceable contract.”); Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127, 
128 (1997) (“The prisoners’ dilemma thus vanishes if the prisoners can write an enforceable 
contract not to confess.”); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An 
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 835 (1995) (“[B]inding, rule-oriented 
trade adjudication is an enforcement mechanism by which states solve a multiparty ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’ arising out of trade contracts.” (footnote omitted)). 
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the promisee.88 In the absence of plaintiff-initiated litigation, Leviathan is 
indifferent to breach of contract. Contract law merely provides a promisee 
with a nonviolent and limited ability to retaliate against a promisor through 
litigation in the event of breach. Accordingly, the story of contract law as a 
simple prohibition on defection must be modified. 
Another solution to the prisoner’s dilemma is for disappointed 
promisees to retaliate against promise breakers. While the classical 
prisoner’s dilemma yields the depressing result of mutual defection when 
played as a one-shot game between rational actors, substantial literature 
demonstrates that when the game is played repeatedly, cooperation develops 
through a strategy of tit-for-tat.89 Each player cooperates until the other 
player defects, at which point the nondefecting player retaliates by defecting 
in the next round.90 The logic behind the strategy is that Able limits the 
probability of Baker’s defection by threatening to punish him should he 
defect.91 Ironically, the ability to retaliate provided by a multi-round game 
increases the probability of cooperation and thus reduces the likelihood that 
retaliation will become necessary. 
The problem with the simple tit-for-tat strategy is that it is costly and 
requires that parties engage in a series of mutual commitments.92 It cannot 
provide for cooperation in one-shot scenarios or where one of the parties 
can simply refuse to deal further with the other party.93 One must be able to 
retaliate without a second transaction. Consider again the case of Spartacus. 
The pirate–admiral was able to break his promise to Spartacus with impunity 
because his navy immunized him from retaliation by the Spartacan army. 
Ironically, perhaps, it was Spartacus’s inability to retaliate that led to the 
breakdown of cooperation, and some mechanism facilitating attacks would 
have resulted in greater cooperation (and, one might add, fewer crucified 
slaves). On the other hand, as the treaty between Agamemnon and Priam 
from The Iliad illustrates, even parties that are violently opposed to one 
another can reach agreement when it is possible to credibly threaten the 
other party with retaliation in the event of breach.94 There is, thus, a sense 
 
 88. See infra notes 164–66 and accompanying text (discussing the private-law structure of 
contract law and the absence of independent state enforcement of contracts). 
 89. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27–54 (1984) 
(explaining success of “tit-for-tat” strategy—e.g., matching the cooperate/defect decision made 
by one’s opponent in the previous round—in multi-round prisoner dilemma “tournaments”). 
 90. Id. at 31. 
 91. Id. at 36–37. 
 92. Id. at 37–38. 
 93. The threat of refusing to deal can itself discipline defection, provided that the returns 
on future cooperation are greater than the returns that can be generated from investing the 
proceeds of a one-time defection. See DIXIT, supra note 85, at 16–17 (discussing the “grim-
trigger strategy”). 
 94. See HOMER, supra note 13, at 128–44 (discussing a treaty between the Trojans and the 
Achaeans). 
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in which cooperation depends on the ability to retaliate rather than, as 
Hobbes suggests, its complete suppression. 
Of course, retaliation may lead to escalating conflict.95 If retaliation 
takes the form of self-help violence, as in the case of feuding Icelandic 
chieftains or Bronze Age Greeks, the target may fight back. Furthermore, if 
the legitimacy of the initial attack is not clearly established, then the natural 
reaction of the attacked party’s tribe is to retaliate. The reason is simple: In 
an anarchic system, the credible threat of retaliation is the best way to avoid 
unprovoked predation. A retaliatory threat is only credible, however, if one 
consistently retaliates against apparent wrongs, which is why the strong 
culture of honor and vengeance emerged in anarchic societies. Not 
surprisingly, these societies developed memorable rituals—such as the 
dismembering of goats and dogs—by which retaliation for breach of 
contract could be distinguished from simple predation. These rituals were 
attempts to reduce, ex ante, the potential level of ex post violence in the 
event of retaliation for breach. As we have seen, over time, societies 
developed stronger safeguards against the risk of escalating conflict inherent 
in encouraging permissible retaliation for breach: the extraction of wealth 
replaced bloodier responses; adjudication came to replace self-help, acting 
as a gatekeeper to retaliation; and finally, the scope of even monetary 
retaliation was limited.96 
The shift from self-help and violence to adjudication and money 
damages is fairly easy to understand in terms of limiting the potential costs 
of retaliation. But while the logic of limitation finds a home within the idea 
of civil recourse theory, explaining why expectation damages, rather than 
some other amount, should be the upper limit on consented-to retaliation is 
less obvious. Limiting consented-to attacks at attacks for expectation 
damages ensures that a promisee does not receive more through retaliatory 
litigation than he or she would receive through successful cooperation. This 
 
 95. Robert Bates provides the following trenchant summary of the problem: 
When the threat of retaliation works, the private provision of coercion can produce 
peace, as Evans-Pritchard argued; but the behaviors and beliefs that supply peace 
also encourage behavior that increases the likelihood of violence. In such societies, 
private warriors populate public places; people bearing arms and intimating their 
willingness to employ them strut in the boulevards and cluster in the marketplace. 
Public places are populated with provocateurs; where families are honor-bound to 
protect their own, hot-tempered youths find protection against the consequences 
of brazen behavior. Interactions thus take place in a volatile ambience of honor 
and impudence; young hotheads move to the fore; and a culture of machismo 
permeates the society. . . . Provocative acts become commonplace—but also 
uncommonly dangerous because they can unleash violent reprisals. 
ROBERT H. BATES, PROSPERITY AND VIOLENCE 46 (2001). 
 96. It is also worth noting that as the scope of retaliation was limited and the possibility of 
escalation was reduced, the rituals surrounding contract formation have become considerably 
less colorful. 
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differentiates legitimate retaliation for breach from mere predation. Hence, 
Lord Nottingham, writing in the 1690s, articulated equity’s oversight of 
penal bonds not in terms of providing just compensation, but in terms of 
limiting predation through the courts: “Yet equity will not suffer any advantage 
to be taken of this bond beyond the true damnification, and therefore usually 
awards an injunction till a trial at law be had either upon an action of 
Covenant or upon a special issue quantum damnificatus.”97 Similarly, there is 
a difference between a legitimate raid carried out because the target broke a 
covenant and a merely predatory raid aimed at carrying off the target’s 
wealth.98 
In short, rather than completely displacing the world of anarchy, as 
Hobbes suggested, contract law tames and limits the anarchic mechanism of 
retaliation without repudiating its basic structure. It solves the problem of 
opportunism and facilitates the human flourishing made possible by social 
cooperation.99 It does this by facilitating retaliation against contract 
breachers in ways that prevent retaliation from becoming merely predatory. 
B. RECOURSE AND PLURALISM 
There is an important sense in which the civil recourse theory is 
radically incomplete. Allowing limited retaliation against contract breachers 
is desirable because it facilitates cooperation. A system of cooperation based 
on retaliation, however, is necessarily brittle, and therefore the scope of 
permissible retaliation must be limited. The idea of civil recourse, having 
elucidated the nature of contractual liability, tells us comparatively little 
about the rest of contract doctrine. 
To date, no theory has emerged as a widely accepted interpretation of 
all of contract law.100 Rather, differing theories successfully explain 
particular doctrines, while failing to explain others.101 Rival theories are able 
 
 97. LORD NOTTINGHAM’S ‘MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE’ AND ‘PROLEGOMENA OF 
CHANCERY AND EQUITY’ 275 (D.E.C. Yale ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1965) (1673–1675) 
(emphasis added). 
 98. Signaling the difference between these two types of attacks is why the bloody covenant 
rituals acknowledging the legitimacy of attack were so important. The point was to keep a 
healthy anarchy from degenerating into the mindlessly predatory anarchy envisioned by 
Hobbes. 
 99. This argument, of course, does not rest on the notion that all forms of social 
cooperation are good. Indeed, doctrines such as the law’s refusal to recognize illegal or 
immoral contracts can be understood as a refusal to facilitate pathological forms of 
cooperation. 
 100. See Nathan B. Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 
1483–84 (2005) (summarizing the polyphony of contemporary contract theory). 
 101. See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus, From Langdell to Law and Economics: Two Conceptions of Stare Decisis 
in Contract Law and Theory, 94 VA. L. REV. 157 (2007) (discussing how law and economics and 
moral theories of contract seek to explain different features of our legal practices); Nathan B. 
Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract Damages, 64 WASH. & LEE L. 
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to provide explanation for these neglected doctrines, but often at the price 
of discounting those doctrines that the first theory explained.102 For 
example, economic theories explain the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale103 as a 
penalty default rule;104 but these theories encounter difficulty in explaining 
expectation damages.105 Promissory theories are able to account for why the 
law should recognize the obligation to keep a contract; but they fail to 
explain the doctrine of consideration, which eliminates liability for a whole 
class of promises.106 On a broader level, Jody Kraus argues that efficiency 
theories provide detailed accounts of the outcomes in contract cases, while 
failing to account for the common law’s ex post language of rights and 
duties.107 Autonomy theories, he goes on to assert, provide an account of 
contract law’s internal language, but fail to yield concrete explanations for 
the outcomes in particular cases.108 
There are three potential responses to this normative pluralism. On one 
hand, we could claim that contract law lacks any internal coherence.109 A 
second approach is to continue to search for a unified normative theory that 
could account for the bulk of contract doctrine.110 The final approach is to 
construct a theory that integrates various normative goals in a coherent 
manner.111 A recourse theory is pluralistic in this final sense. As I argue 
below, this theory casts light on several contract doctrines that seemed 
 
REV. 829, 843–59 (2007) (discussing the comparative failures and successes of autonomy and 
efficiency theories’ explanation of doctrines surrounding contract damages). 
 102. See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 1, at 691–94 (arguing that autonomy theories capture the 
language of judicial opinions in contract cases while efficiency theories capture the outcomes in 
contract cases). 
 103. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.); 9 Ex. 341. 
 104. See Ian Ayers & Robert Gerner, Filling the Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 101–04 (1989) (discussing the holding in Hadley as a 
penalty default rule). 
 105. See Oman, supra note 101, at 851–59. 
 106. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 29 (1981). 
 107. See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 1, at 690. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See, e.g., Peter Alces, Unintelligent Design in Contract Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 505, 508–
09 (arguing that ultimately contract law reflects a series of historical accidents and ad hoc 
decisions that lack any underlying conceptual unity). 
 110. This, for example, is what Randy Barnett claims to have done with his consent theory 
of contract, which is similar to Charles Fried’s promise-based theory in its acceptance of liberal 
individualism as a basic premise, but which differs from it by jettisoning the concept of 
promising. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) 
[hereinafter Barnett, Consent Theory]; Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 1022 (1992). 
 111. See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law: Groundwork for the Reconciliation of 
Autonomy and Efficiency, 1 SOC. POL. & LEGAL PHIL. 385 (2002); Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling 
Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420 
(2001). 
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contradictory or anomalous. It would be foolish, however, to claim that the 
notion of consent to retaliation lies behind all of contract doctrine. It 
provides an account of some of the law’s core structures, but there are many 
doctrines that it fails to explain. The strength of the theory lies not in its 
ability to account for all strands of contract law, but rather in its ability to 
allow other normative principles to account for these doctrines without 
contradicting them. The way a civil recourse theory accommodates other 
normative concerns can be seen best in the doctrines surrounding remedies, 
to which we now turn. 
IV. CIVIL RECOURSE AND SOME PUZZLES OF CONTRACT DOCTRINE 
The civil recourse theory provides theoretical traction on three puzzles 
in the law of contract remedies: the penalty-clause doctrine; limitations on 
expectation damages; and the private-law structure of contractual liability. 
A. THE PENALTY DOCTRINE 
It is black-letter law that a so-called penalty clause is unenforceable.112 
Parties are free to specify the amount of money that they must pay in the 
event of breach, but the amount chosen must be a reasonable estimate of 
one’s actual damages.113 A liquidated-damages clause that exceeds a 
reasonable estimate of the parties’ actual expectation damages will be 
deemed a penalty clause.114 For many theories, this rule is puzzling. 
For autonomy theorists, the penalty doctrine is a stark limitation on 
freedom of contract.115 If contracts are to be respected because they 
represent the autonomous choices of the parties, then, unless there are 
third-party effects, the law ought to be indifferent as to the substantive 
content of agreements.116 This content is a matter for the parties to decide, 
and for the State to restrict or second guess if the choices of private parties 
fail to show them the respect that they are due. Granted, some promissory 
theorists, such as Seana Shiffrin, question whether one can make a promise 
that contemplates its own breach, but this argument suggests that contract 
law should reject not only the penalty doctrine, but the entire notion of 
liquidated damages.117 But for those who ground contracts in promissory 
 
 112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981) (setting forth the penalty-
clause doctrine). 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts, 43 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 427, 433 (1995) (“The coherence of penalty clauses ban with the underlying 
philosophy of freedom of contract is questionable, and the issue is frequently raised both in 
judicial opinion and in the academic literature.”). 
 116. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 110, at 286; FRIED, supra note 106, at 105; 
SMITH, supra note 53, at 246–47. 
 117. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
708, 734–36 (2007). 
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morality or the autonomy of citizens in a liberal polity, the penalty doctrine 
constitutes an interpretive embarrassment. 
Economic theorists, who place a premium on the value of private 
ordering, likewise have difficulty accounting for the penalty doctrine. 
Initially, the theory of efficient breach seems to suggest that penalty clauses 
are undesirable because they overincentivize performance.118 From an 
economic point of view, there is nothing per se efficient about the 
performance of contracts—rather, the parties should perform only when the 
benefits of performance outweigh its costs.119 Penalty clauses appear to 
incentivize performance even when the costs of breach outweigh the 
benefits of performance. This apparently neat explanation, however, holds 
true only if the costs of renegotiation are high. It falls apart once the 
possibility of ex post renegotiation emerges.120 If a promisor can realize 
greater returns from breach than performance will realize for a promisee, 
he can always bargain for a release from his obligations by offering the 
promisee part of the upside profit from breach. In effect, a promisor can 
threaten, “Agree to release me, or else I will perform and you won’t be able 
to capture any of the benefits from my breach.” Indeed, because penalty 
clauses commit the promisor to sharing a larger portion of the surplus 
created by breach opportunities ex post, they may provide an efficient ex 
ante bargaining tool for promisors who wish to credibly commit to dividing 
such a surplus with promisees.121 
One might try to justify the rule on the ground that it protects 
contracting parties from inconsiderately imposing crushing liability on 
themselves in the event of breach.122 For example, some scholars have 
pointed to the experimental results of behavioral decision theorists, which 
suggest that humans are prone to systematic errors in how they assess the 
risk of unlikely events such as breach of contract.123 Accordingly, courts’ 
willingness to vigilantly police liquidated-damages clauses can be justified by 
 
 118. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 31–34 (2d 
ed. 1989) (detailing why the expectation remedy leads to an efficient outcome in breach-of-
contract cases). 
 119. See id. 
 120. See generally Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient 
Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988) (arguing that, given the possibility of renegotiation ex 
post, there is no reason to suppose that expectation damages represent a uniquely efficient way 
of internalizing the costs of breach). 
 121. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 260–61 (5th ed. 2007). 
 122. See Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(Posner, J.) (“On this view the refusal to enforce penalty clauses is (at best) paternalistic—and it 
seems odd that courts should display parental solicitude for large corporations.”). 
 123. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995). 
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the need to protect people from their faulty assessments of the risk of paying 
a penalty.124 
The problem with this interpretation of the doctrine is that it cannot 
explain why penalty clauses are singled out for special monitoring.125 After 
all, the behavioralist research suggests that people are likely to inaccurately 
assess the risks associated with events other than contract breach; yet the law 
normally does not inquire into the substance of contractual terms. For 
example, if A loans B $10 to be repaid with ten percent interest in one year, 
the penalty doctrine would disallow a clause requiring the payment of a 
fairly trivial additional sum—say $50—if B failed to tender the $11 as 
promised.126 It is difficult to see why the law should protect parties from the 
decision to enter into such relatively harmless agreements. Alternatively, 
suppose that A loaned an enormous sum of money to B, so enormous that B 
had little hope of repaying it. Absent fraud or unconscionability, such a 
contract is legally unobjectionable.127 The penalty-clause doctrine thus 
seems, at best, a ham-fisted attempt at paternalism.128 
In contrast, a civil recourse theory of contractual liability has a simple 
explanation for the penalty doctrine: Law exists in part to limit the ability of 
parties to engage in predation against one another. This does not mean that 
the law eliminates any ability to retaliate against wrongs. Rather, the law 
civilizes recourse by replacing private violence with private litigation and 
limiting satisfaction to the extraction of wealth from the party in the 
wrong.129 Consider again the covenant between Agamemnon and Priam 
 
 124. Robert Hillman has written: 
These cognitive phenomena and the predictions they generate about contract 
parties’ decision making both help to explain the judicial response to liquidated 
damages provisions and tend to confirm the appropriateness of the current 
aggressive judicial approach to the issue. The parties view contract breakdown as a 
remote possibility, fail to focus on it, and, to the extent that they do think about 
breach, seek a fair remedial package. Because of the lack of paradigmatic 
bargaining with respect to liquidated damages provisions and because of their 
potential, due to unanticipated circumstances, to generate penalties and windfalls 
contrary to the parties’ intentions, courts do and should enthusiastically police 
liquidated damages provisions. 
Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated 
Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 732 (2000). 
 125. See id. at 735 (“[W]hy should judges single out liquidated damages for this treatment? 
What contract term would be safe from this attack? Aggressive use of this reasoning to question 
contract enforceability could therefore undermine contract law’s goals of certainty and 
predictability, which may be better served by the traditional objective theory of assent.”). 
 126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 365 cmt. a (1981). 
 127. See id. §§ 162, 208. 
 128. See Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(Posner, J.) (“[S]ince little effort is made to prevent businessmen from assuming risks, these 
reasons are no better than makeweights.”). 
 129. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 3. 
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before the walls of Ilium. The parties consented that in the event of breach 
their throats could be slit, their children enslaved, and their wives raped.130 
The agreement is barbarous and unjust, but the injustice does not reside in 
the fact that the promisor consented to attack in the event of breach. The 
barbarity of the agreement lies in the excessive nature of the attack. The 
advent of contract law wrought the improvement of limiting recourse to 
retaliation that is proportionate to the wrong inflicted. The law does not 
allow a party to consent to a disproportionate response because the 
establishment of a system of private law was fueled by a desire to limit the 
scope and violence of recourse in the face of wrongs.131 
This account is consistent with two other aspects of the penalty 
doctrine. First, the civil recourse doctrine does not work in reverse. The law 
will not honor a liquidated-damages clause that exceeds the value of what 
was promised; but there is no objection to clauses that limit recourse to less 
than expectation damages in the event of breach.132 In effect, parties may 
declare that they will be satisfied with recourse at less than the full value of 
what was promised to them.133 Such subcompensatory recourse is not 
excessive, and therefore is unobjectionable. Indeed, parties are free to 
disclaim all rights to recourse ex ante by agreeing to otherwise valid 
contracts that contain clauses disclaiming that they are legally 
enforceable.134 
Second, the doctrine does not sweep into its ambit true option 
contracts, in which parties agree ex ante on a price for the purchase of a 
release from certain obligations. For instance, so-called pay-or-play contracts 
are quite common in the film industry, and are routinely honored by the 
courts.135 Under these contracts, an actor is promised a fixed sum of 
money—say $1 million—in return for the actor’s promise to perform in or 
refrain from performing in a contemplated film at the movie studio’s 
 
 130. See HOMER, supra note 13, at 128–44. 
 131. See LOCKE, supra note 54, at 324; Goldberg, Constitutional Status, supra note 3, at 602 
(arguing that allowing civil recourse for tort actions limits the cycle of escalating violence and 
vengeance that would result from extra-legal recourse); Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 3, at 
736 (“Indeed, an earmark of our civil legal system is that it does not involve violent remedies, 
but civil remedies; it does not involve punishment.”). 
 132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. d (“A term that fixes as 
damages an amount that is unreasonably small does not come within the rule stated in this 
Section, but a court may refuse to enforce it as unconscionable under the rule stated in 
§ 208.”). 
 133. See Rose & Frank Co. v. J.R. Crompton & Bros., [1925] A.C. 445 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (holding that courts should honor an agreement expressly disclaiming a right to 
recourse to damages in the event of breach). 
 134. See id. 
 135. See, e.g., Welch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Film Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(“The contract included a standard ‘pay or play’ clause, under which the studio could 
terminate Welch from the film at any time, but was obligated to pay her the full contract price, 
unless she failed to fulfill her contractual obligations.”), vacated, 782 P.2d 594 (Cal. 1989). 
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discretion.136 If the studio and the actor instead entered into a bilateral 
contract where the actor promised to act and the studio promised to hire 
the actor for a film at the rate of $1 million, a $1 million liquidated-damages 
clause could well be deemed a penalty clause.137 The actor would have a 
duty to mitigate his damages by finding another role, and in any case his 
claim for the lost $1 million under the contract would be offset by the 
amount saved—in this case, the cost of performing in the movie—as a result 
of the breach.138 
From a purely economic point of view, there is no distinction between 
the pay-or-play agreement and the liquidated-damages clause. Both are 
options. In contrast, the legal distinction makes sense if the aim of the 
penalty doctrine is to limit retaliation. The $1 million pay-or-play clause is 
not meant as recourse in the event of breach; indeed, in refusing to make 
the movie and tendering $1 million, the studio fully performs its contractual 
obligations, and there is no breach. On the other hand, when the clause is 
meant to specify the recourse to be allowed in the event of breach, then the 
law limits recourse to proportionate damages. 
B. LIMITATIONS ON EXPECTATION DAMAGES 
In a sense, the modern philosophy of contract law begins with the 
question of expectation damages, famously posed in Lon Fuller and William 
R. Perdue’s article, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages.139 For Fuller and 
Perdue, the mystery was why the law should award expectation damages 
rather than reliance damages.140 Their answer was a rather convoluted story 
about how expectation damages were the most effective way to protect 
reliance.141 Modern promissory theorists, however, have offered a more 
straightforward account: Expectation damages “enforce” contracts by giving 
to the promisee the value of what was promised.142 Indeed, Melvin 
Eisenberg has made a powerful empirical argument that, in most cases, 
 
 136. See Victor P. Goldberg, Bloomer Girl Revisited or How To Frame an Unmade Picture, 1998 
WIS. L. REV. 1051, 1070–82 (discussing pay-or-play clauses in Hollywood contracts). 
 137. See Lynch v. CIBY 2000, No. CV 97-9022, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 13, 1998) (refusing to rule a pay-or-play clause a penalty clause because the plaintiff 
chose one of two options for performance rather than breaching). 
 138. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981). 
 139. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 
YALE L.J. 52, 52–53 (1936). 
 140. See id. at 53. 
 141. See id. at 73–75. 
 142. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 106, at 21–27 (arguing that the enforcement of promises 
requires either specific performance or the rendering of an amount equivalent to the promised 
performance). But see Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 
1 (2007), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/cfried.pdf (arguing that the 
promissory theory of contract need not imply a preference for specific performance). 
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expectation damages constitute a kind of virtual specific performance.143 
Alternatively, one might argue for expectation damages on the grounds of 
corrective justice, as Peter Benson, Curtis Bridgeman, and Andrew Gold 
have done.144 Finally, of course, the theory of efficient breach seems to 
explain expectation damages as forcing promisors to fully internalize the 
costs of breach.145 
Regardless of what one makes of the merits of any of these 
arguments,146 they all suffer from a basic problem: The law seldom awards 
full expectation damages.147 A host of doctrines ensure that the actual 
damages awarded to any plaintiff will be less than the value of her 
expectancy. First, at least under American law, parties must bear their own 
legal expenses, which means that in the absence of an attorney’s fee clause, 
a plaintiff will always be undercompensated for the full value of her 
contractual expectation.148 Second, damages may only be recovered where 
they can be calculated with certainty.149 Real, but uncertain, losses receive 
no compensation beyond nominal damages.150 Third, under the rule in 
Hadley v. Baxendale, consequential damages are sharply limited.151 Those 
damages that are not foreseeable at the time of breach are not recoverable 
unless they are specially communicated at the time of contract formation.152 
In at least some jurisdictions, additional consequential damages must also be 
 
 143. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient 
Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 978 (2005) (arguing 
that damage awards in most cases operate as a form of virtual specific performance by allowing 
promises to recover through the market). 
 144. See Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of 
Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1149 (1989); Peter 
Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1675–76 (2007); Peter 
Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of Justification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 273, 291 
(1995); Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability with Corrective Justice in Contract Law, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3013, 3028–31 (2007); Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1, 24 (2009). Indeed, elsewhere I have myself suggested that corrective justice 
offered a justification for expectation damages. See Oman, supra note 101, at 844. 
 145. See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 118, at 31–34 (detailing why the expectation remedy 
leads to an efficient outcome in breach-of-contract cases). 
 146. And there is reason to be skeptical of all of them. See SMITH, supra note 53, at 409–13 
(discussing the shortcomings of autonomy and transfer accounts of expectation damages); 
Oman, supra note 101, at 851–53 (discussing the shortcomings of efficiency theories of 
expectation damages). 
 147. See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Lore, 27 J. CORP. L. 505, 507 (2002) (“[C]ontracts 
people continue to report that the goal of expectancy damages is to make injured parties 
whole. The reality is dramatically different. A large set of remedial rules often limits the 
recovery of injured parties to well below expectancy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 148. See Richmond Am. Homes of Colo., Inc. v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 656, 673 (2008); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981). 
 149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. § 351. 
 152. See id. 
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specially agreed to ex ante.153 Fourth, in the event of a promisor’s breach, a 
promisee has a duty to mitigate her damages.154 She must make reasonable 
efforts to limit the amount that the promisor must pay.155 Failure to do so 
results in a reduction of any claim for damages.156 These limitations present 
problems for any theory that takes full expectation damages as the correct 
remedy for breach because they ensure that full expectation damages are 
virtually never paid.157 
As a doctrinal matter, it thus makes more sense to think of expectation 
damages as a limitation on awards rather than an entitlement in the event of 
breach. The point is most powerfully illustrated by contemporary doctrine’s 
treatment of claims for reliance damages. According to the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, reliance damages are available as an alternative 
measure for recovery.158 As a practical matter, plaintiffs are likely to seek 
reliance damages in those cases where the reliance measure would yield a 
larger recovery than expectation damages—for example, where a promisee 
makes a losing contract that the promisor then serendipitously breaches.159 
Courts (and the Restatement), however, have been unsympathetic to 
plaintiffs who attempt to recover the full value of their reliance on a losing 
contract.160 Rather, defendants are allowed to provide evidence of what the 
plaintiff would have lost had the contract been performed, and any award 
will then be reduced by these avoided costs.161 The result is that the 
expectation measure—when it can be determined—operates as an effective 
limit on the amount of reliance damages that can be recovered.162 
The structure of expectation damages must be viewed in light of the 
previously discussed limiting doctrines. Requirements of certainty, 
limitations on consequential damages, and the like all serve to cabin the 
recourse available to promisees against breaching promisors.163 The 
 
 153. See, e.g., Morrow v. First Nat’l Bank of Hot Springs, 550 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. 1977) 
(adopting the tacit-agreement version of the Hadley rule). 
 154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See Oman, supra note 101, at 872 (noting that due to the limitations on damages, full 
expectation damages are virtually never awarded). 
 158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349. 
 159. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.16, at 805–08 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing 
the situations in which plaintiffs generally ask for reliance damages rather than expectation 
damages). 
 160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 
1755, 1772 (arguing that the availability of reliance damages simply shifts the burden of proof 
and that expectation damages operate as an upper limit on recovery). 
 163. See supra notes 147–57 and accompanying text (summarizing the various doctrinal 
limitations on full expectation damages). 
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expectation measure, rather than providing the value of an entitlement, 
represents an upper limit on recovery. The actual amount that a plaintiff 
can recover may in practice be considerably less than the full value of his 
expectation interest. Indeed, plaintiffs are free to sue and ask courts for less 
than the value of their full expectation damages, and they frequently do so. 
There is no impediment to such suits. Rather, claims for damages are 
disallowed when they exceed the expectation measure or fall within one of 
the other limiting doctrines discussed above. The virtue of the civil recourse 
theory is that it sees damages in terms of limited retaliation, rather than in 
terms of compensation for a lost right. Accordingly, the logic of expectation 
as limit runs with the grain of the theory rather than against it. 
C. THE PRIVATE-LAW STRUCTURE OF CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY 
The civil recourse theory also provides an explanation for the basic, 
private-law structure of contractual liability.164 This structure consists of two 
features: bilateralism and private standing. Bilateralism means that damages 
in private litigation always pass from the defendant to the plaintiff.165 Private 
standing means that rather than having a state official independently 
enforce contracts, the law waits for disappointed promisees to bring suits.166 
In the absence of a decision by the promisee to proceed against the 
promisor, nothing happens. Both of these features present challenges for 
the dominant theories of contract law, and both are explained by the civil 
recourse theory. 
Economic theories claim that damages exist to internalize the costs of 
breach.167 Ideally, this aligns the promisor’s private incentives with society’s 
 
 164. While over the course of the twentieth century the distinction between private law and 
public law fell into disfavor, of late there have been dissenters from this dominant consensus. 
Most radically, Ernest Weinrib has argued for the complete autonomy of private law. “The 
purpose of private law,” he writes enigmatically, “is to be private law.” ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE 
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 5 (1995). Even theorists such as Jules Coleman and Benjamin Zipursky, 
who reject Weinrib’s full-throated formalism in favor of what they label pragmatism, have 
insisted that private law has a distinctive formal structure for which any adequate theory must 
account. See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST 
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 3–12 (2003); Benjamin Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL 
THEORY 457, 458–59 (2000). All of these theorists have focused their attention on tort law, but 
the basic structures that they identify are equally present in contract cases, even if this fact has 
attracted little attention among contract theorists. But see, e.g., Peter Benson, The Unity of 
Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118, 170–84 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) 
(discussing the bilateral structure of contract law); Oman, supra note 101, at 851–59 (noting 
that economic theories of contract damages fail to account for the bilateral structure of 
contract law). Their account of private law’s structure has focused on two key features discussed 
in the text. 
 165. See Oman, supra note 101, at 846–51 (discussing bilateralism). 
 166. See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 164, at 458 (discussing the plaintiff-centric nature of 
private-law actions). 
 167. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 121, at 208–12 (arguing that contract damages serve 
to internalize the costs of breach). 
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collective interests.168 If damages incentivize promisors, however, there is no 
reason to pay them to promisees. The incentive for the promisor would be 
identical whether the damages were thrown down a rat hole or given to the 
government. Bilateralism is economically perverse.169 Damages provide 
promisees with insurance against breach.170 This creates a moral hazard by 
encouraging overreliance on promisors’ commitments.171 Ideally, a system 
would perfectly incentivize efficient performance, and the promisee would 
make reliance decisions purely on the basis of the likelihood of performance 
and not the availability of compensation through damages in the event of 
breach.172 Moral theories do not fare better. Consider Charles Fried’s 
argument that the law of contracts tracks the morality of promising.173 This 
claim fails to explain why the law should enforce promises by forcing 
promisors to pay promisees instead of simply punishing breach with a fine or 
some other sanction. The idea of promise making does not seem to have 
anything to say about the choice between a regime of criminal sanctions and 
one of private lawsuits.174 
 
 168. See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 118, at 31–34 (detailing the argument why the 
expectation remedy leads to an efficient outcome in breach-of-contract cases). 
 169. See Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under 
Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98, 98 (1996) (discussing the phenomenon of 
expectation damages causing overinvestment); Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, 
Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478, 487–91 (1996) 
(offering economic proof that expectation damages do not promote efficiency); Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & ECON. 691, 693 (1983) 
(arguing that without reliance, the rule of law produces damages that are not Pareto optimal); 
William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. 
ECON. 39, 47–48 (1984) (noting that expectation and reliance damages produce inefficient 
results); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 472 (1980) 
(discussing the problems of breach in reaching Pareto efficiency); Steven Shavell, The Design of 
Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. ECON. 121, 124–27 (1984) (describing the relationship 
between efficient breach and the Pareto efficient production contract). 
 170. See Oman, supra note 101, at 852–53. Put another way, because the promisee can 
count on compensation through damages in the event of breach, she will engage in investment 
based on the expectation of performance in cases when the probability of performance does 
not justify such investment. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 121, at 269–73. 
 171. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 121, at 269–73. 
 172. See POLINSKY, supra note 118, at 36–41. So long as damages pass from defendants to 
plaintiffs, avoiding overreliance by reducing recovery will overincentivize breach, while avoiding 
the over-incentivizing breach by allowing recovery will over-incentivize reliance. See Oman, supra 
note 101, at 853. 
 173. See FRIED, supra note 106, at 14–17. 
 174. Cf. Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 489, 489–91 (1989) (arguing that promissory theories of contract have nothing 
to say about the content of contract law’s default rules). One cannot object that promissory 
commitments are less important and, therefore, do not merit criminal enforcement. It is 
possible to calibrate the sanction for breach by simply providing a smaller sanction. Not all 
crimes are major evils. Rather, the criminal law simply punishes minor evils with minor 
sanctions. 
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It seems initially plausible to justify private standing on practical 
grounds. There are many breaches of contract, and it would be difficult and 
expensive for government prosecutors to acquire information about such 
breaches.175 The law thus empowers plaintiffs to act as private attorneys 
general and incentivizes them with damage payments.176 On this view, the 
promisee is like the whistleblower in a qui tam action who receives a bounty 
in return for bringing an action that vindicates social policy.177 Under 
efficiency theories, plaintiffs are enlisted to incentivize optimal 
performance, while under moral theories, plaintiffs serve as enforcers of the 
obligation to perform one’s promises.178 This pragmatic argument, however, 
cannot explain the odd fact that only the promisee (or a third-party 
beneficiary) may bring an action for breach of contract.179 If private 
standing were simply a diffuse method of enforcement, anyone who 
happens to have information regarding a breach ought to be able to bring 
suit. Indeed, in whistleblower actions the only connection that the plaintiff 
must have to the defendant is knowledge of wrongdoing.180 There is no 
requirement that the plaintiff be in privity.181 But this is not the case in 
contract actions. 
The civil recourse theory accounts for both private standing and 
bilateralism because it does not view contractual liability as the enforcement 
of some underlying moral duty or as the creation of optimal incentives by 
the State. It sees contractual liability as the civilization of what is at its core 
an anarchic system of self-help. If contracts consist of consent to retaliation 
in the event of breach, the plaintiff-centered system of private standing 
makes sense. The legal system waits on the plaintiff’s decision to sue because 
it is not ultimately organized to enforce contracts in some abstract or 
absolute sense. Rather, it serves to facilitate the private retaliation of the 
disappointed promisee against the promisor. Others who might have the 
information necessary to press a successful suit are not allowed to sue on the 
 
 175. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 141 tbl.C-2 (2010), available at http://www. 
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf 
(reporting over one thousand contract-dispute actions pending in only the federal courts). 
 176. See Oman, supra note 101, at 848–49. 
 177. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2006) (providing the procedure by which qui tam recoveries 
are divided between the government and the qui tam plaintiff). 
 178. In the case of corrective-justice theories, discussed supra note 144 and accompanying 
text, plaintiffs substitute for prosecutors, punishing breaching promisors who fail to carry out 
their duties of repair. 
 179. See Mahalsky v. Salem Tool Co., 461 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir. 1972) (“Ohio has no 
remedy for and does not recognize an action in contract absent privity . . . .”) 
 180. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). 
 181. See United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 147 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that a qui tam plaintiff only has standing as a representative of the government and 
that “only the government has a dog in the fight”). 
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contract because the promisor never consented to retaliation by a third 
party in the event of breach. This can be seen most clearly in the law’s 
treatment of third-party beneficiaries. Under limited circumstances, third 
parties may sue on the contract, but the touchstone of a third party’s 
potential standing is the promisor’s and promisee’s intent.182 If both parties 
agree that the third party shall not have standing, that party cannot sue, 
even if he or she is the contract’s intended beneficiary.183 
Bilateralism can also be explained by the logic of limiting retaliation. In 
its rawest form in the ancient world, recourse following a breach took the 
form of bloody attacks on life and limb. What makes the civil recourse 
theory civil is that recourse has been limited and civilized. Promisors cannot 
consent to bloody retaliation that poses the danger of escalation and 
violence; they are limited to consenting to attacks upon their wealth. When a 
disappointed promisee brings suit against a breaching promisor, the money 
passes from promisor to promisee because while the promisor consented to 
monetary retaliation in the event of breach, he only consented to retaliation 
by the promisee. The money is paid only to the promisee because no one 
else has a claim upon it, and indeed, for a third party to make such a claim 
would effectively amount to predation through the courts. Again, the case of 
third-party beneficiaries is the exception that shows the structure of the rule. 
In cases where someone other than the promisee may extract wealth in the 
event of breach, it is because the law deems the parties have implicitly 
consented to the third party’s standing. 
V. RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS 
There are at least three objections against the recourse theory of 
contract. The first is normative. Although an interpretive theory need not 
ultimately persuade us that current law is “all for the best in the best of all 
possible worlds,” it should at least be morally plausible; and this Article’s 
argument seems to rest on the valorization of revenge and retaliation, which 
are morally objectionable. Second, the recourse theory is apparently 
inconsistent with the language that judges use when justifying legal 
 
 182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981) (“A promise in a contract 
creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the 
intended beneficiary may enforce the duty.”); see also Reaugh v. Inner Harbour Hosp., Ltd., 447 
S.E.2d 617, 620 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (“The remedies available to the beneficiary are exactly the 
same as would be available to him if he were a contractual promisee of the performance in 
question.”). 
 183. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 17.3, at 580 (6th ed. 
2009) (“However, if the parties explicitly agree that a third party shall have an enforceable right 
(or defense), their express agreement will be given effect. Similarly, if their agreement states 
that no third party will have an enforceable right, that express intent will be honored.” 
(footnote omitted)); see, e.g., City of Olean v. N.Y. State Envtl. Facilities Corp., 625 N.Y.S.2d 775 
(App. Div. 1995) (holding that contracts can expressly prohibit enforcement by third-party 
beneficiaries). 
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outcomes. Accordingly, it seems to make the implausible assumption that 
these very sophisticated actors are systematically mistaken about what they 
do. Finally, despite this Article’s earlier concession that the recourse theory 
is not meant to explain all of contract law, it does seem flatly inconsistent 
with the doctrines surrounding contract formation. This matters because 
while the theory does not offer a comprehensive explanation, it does offer 
an account of contract formation—namely, consent to retaliation in the 
event of breach—that current doctrine seems to reject. This Part addresses 
and meets these objections. 
A. THE NORMATIVE OBJECTION 
The link between recourse and retaliation makes some theorists queasy. 
John Finnis has rejected civil recourse theories, writing: 
At its root the theory of recourse treats as worthy the emotional 
impulse of a victim of wrongdoing to ‘get even’, by ‘act[ing] 
against’—having recourse against—the rights-violator. This impulse 
is in most if not all respects contrary to the true principle, do not 
answer injury with injury.184 
Most civil recourse theorists, for their part, have been eager to distance the 
idea of recourse from revenge and mere retaliation. John C.P. Goldberg and 
Benjamin Zipursky, for example, sheepishly concede that their theory might 
appear “archaic or barbaric because it links torts to vengeance or 
retaliation,” but deny that they defend revenge.185 In a philosophical tour de 
force, Jason Solomon has tried to meet Finnis’s objection head on, setting 
forth an elaborate justification for why one might legitimately feel aggrieved 
in the face of harm caused by another’s wrongdoing and act accordingly.186 
Finnis’s objection, however, misidentifies what is at stake in retaliation. 
Under this Article’s version of civil recourse, the purpose of moving against 
a breaching promisor is not to vindicate one’s aggrieved feelings. Nor is it a 
matter of retribution—extracting one’s pound of flesh in a gleeful bit of 
revenge against an enemy. Rather, retaliation—the bloody-minded rhetoric 
of Homer notwithstanding—is a solution to a problem of social 
coordination. The goal is not vindication, but cooperation. Admittedly, the 
cooperation facilitated by recourse against contract breachers represents a 
 
 184. Finnis, supra note 3, at 57 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). Finnis has not 
been alone in accusing recourse theorists of exalting revenge. See, e.g., Jason M. Solomon, 
Judging Plaintiffs, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1794 (2007) (“Drawing primarily on Locke and 
Blackstone, the recourse theorists point to the transition from the ‘state of nature’ to the liberal 
state and embrace tort law’s roots as a substitute for private vengeance.”). 
 185. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 
1644 (2002). 
 186. See Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1766 
(2009) (arguing for the legitimacy of recourse based on the notion of the second-person 
standpoint in moral philosophy). 
A3 - OMAN.DOC 12/15/2010  9:24 PM 
2011] CONSENT TO RETALIATION 565 
thin and potentially impersonal relationship. Yet such relationships are 
vitally important in creating prosperous societies.187 Such thin relationships 
can also provide the basis for a deeper human flourishing beyond mere 
material prosperity. As Finnis himself has written, “Many relationships 
initiated merely for business and private need or advantage, or for play and 
individual pleasure, ripen into relationships of more or less intense 
friendship.”188 A defense of recourse need not ultimately resolve the 
question of why social cooperation is desirable;189 so long as one is willing to 
concede its desirability, the credible threat of retaliation can be a key 
element in generating the trust necessary for such cooperation.190 Ironically, 
creating a system that allows retaliation against breaching parties is a way of 
 
 187. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, JOHN JOSEPH WALLIS & BARRY R. WEINGAST, VIOLENCE 
AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED HUMAN HISTORY 
113 (2009) (“[A]ll open access orders [i.e., prosperous and stable modern democracies] are, 
largely, impersonal. . . . Economies in these states are also characterized by impersonal 
exchange.”). Another author explains: 
The lack of legal property thus explains why citizens in developing and former 
communist nations cannot make profitable contracts with strangers, cannot get 
credit, insurance, or utilities services: They have no property to lose. Because they 
have no property to lose, they are taken seriously as contracting parties only by 
their immediate family and neighbors. People with nothing to lose are trapped in 
the grubby basement of the precapitalist world. 
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND 
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 56 (2000). 
 188. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 142 (1980). 
 189. Of course, believing that social cooperation is valuable does not imply that all 
cooperation is valuable. Criminal conspiracies, for example, may show high levels of 
cooperation—cooperation that makes them more, rather than less, pernicious. Contract 
doctrine, however, is sensitive to such concerns, refusing to enforce illegal contracts or 
agreements in furtherance of an immoral purpose. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§§ 159–179 (1981) (voiding contracts on the grounds of misrepresentation, duress, and 
illegality). 
 190. There is an irony in the way that retaliation fosters cooperation—an irony that seems 
embedded in the structure of markets more generally. Hence, Jules Coleman has written: 
Markets require contracting or exchange. Exchange is threatened by uncertainty. 
Uncertainty can be reduced by factors that are endogenous to the relationship 
between the parties. For example, if potential contractors are involved in repeat 
play or are members of closely knit communities, then their incentives to defect 
from transactions will be reduced by reputation effects. But in these sorts of 
circumstances, pure markets are not as important to social stability as they 
otherwise would be. For example, we would not think that a family needs to 
organize itself as a “market” in order to make allocation decisions. And here is the 
problem: Under precisely those circumstances where markets are most desirable 
from the point of view of social stability, they are most difficult to create and 
sustain, whereas in those circumstances most conducive to low-cost market 
interaction, because of their impersonality, markets may well be less desirable 
forms of social organization. 
JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 68–69 (1992). 
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increasing cooperation so that such attacks become less and less 
necessary.191 
Contract law in its current form emerged out of the tension between 
the need to allow retaliation to facilitate cooperation and the need to limit 
the scope of that retaliation so that it does not threaten the general peace of 
society.192 It accomplished this by channeling retaliatory attacks into the 
legal system. In place of self-help violence, with its explosive potential for 
escalation, we have the bloodless tourney of lawyers. This reduces the 
potentially disruptive force of retaliation in three ways. First, it eliminates 
violence as a means of retaliation. Bloodshed is replaced by debts, debts that 
can be violently satisfied only by a sheriff or marshal through the tightly 
controlled procedure of a writ of fieri facias. Second, it makes a third party 
(the court) the gatekeeper for retaliation. This both increases the perceived 
legitimacy of the plaintiff’s attack and limits the possibility of excessive, 
emotional, or predatory retaliation.193 Finally, it caps the level of permissible 
retaliation at the value of the promised performance. The result is a system 
of retaliation, but one that has been civilized and controlled.194 
B. THE TRANSPARENCY OBJECTION 
The recourse theory seems inconsistent with the language that 
common-law judges use in deciding contract cases. Because the theory is 
offered as an interpretive account of the law, it seems a major objection that 
it does not take seriously the reasons judges offer when justifying why a 
plaintiff or defendant wins a lawsuit. Surely, one might argue, a theory that 
purports to explain the underlying structure of the law must account for this 
language. Alternatively, if the theory explicitly or implicitly asserts that 
judges are systematically mistaken about the reasons behind their decisions, 
this surely counts as an objection to the interpretation. After all, it seems 
unlikely that judges could be so ill-informed about their own practices. This 
objection can be met in at least three ways. The first is to deny that judicial 
 
 191. See, e.g., BATES, supra note 95, at 45 (“The very readiness of the Nuer [a tribe in the 
southern Sudan without any formal system of law enforcement] to employ violence provides a 
reason, then, that violence so rarely takes place.”). Bates clearly notes that “[t]he security [the 
norms of feuding and retaliation] supply to the producers and accumulators of wealth is 
fragile.” Id. at 48. 
 192. Cf. Goldberg, Constitutional Status, supra note 3, at 602–03 (arguing that allowing civil 
recourse for tort actions limits the cycle of escalating violence and vengeance that would result 
from extra-legal recourse). 
 193. Such excessive, emotional, and predatory retaliation is, of course, a staple of the epic 
literature depicting the more anarchic worlds. Homer’s The Iliad famously opens with the rage 
of Achilles, and the danger of feuds spinning out of control is a repeated theme in the 
Icelandic sagas. HOMER, supra note 13, at 77. 
 194. Cf. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 3, at 736 (“Indeed, an earmark of our civil legal 
system is that it does not involve violent remedies, but civil remedies; it does not involve 
punishment.”). 
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language places strong constraints on interpretive theories. The second is to 
argue that judges actually do use language that is consistent with the 
recourse theory. The third is to note that the language of rights and 
obligations in judicial opinions refers to legal rights and obligations, not to 
the structure of the moral arguments that justify those rights and 
obligations. 
According to an important strand of thinking, the common law 
presents itself as a transparent practice. The reasons offered by judges are 
meant to be the real reasons for the decisions that they reach. As Stephen 
Smith puts the point: “The theorist’s explanation of the law must show why 
the legal concepts employed by a judge are an appropriate way of expressing 
in practice the broader concepts that the theorist argues underlie the law. A 
good theory, on this view, works through, rather than around, judicial 
reasoning.”195 If we take transparency as a criterion for a successful 
interpretive theory, the civil recourse argument seems open to at least two 
objections. The first is that judges frequently explain expectation damages 
in terms of compensating plaintiffs for the value of their lost bargains.196 
The purpose, they aver, is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he or 
she would have been in had the contract been performed.197 The civil 
recourse theory, in contrast, suggests that damages are not primarily 
compensatory. Rather, expectation damages serve only as an upper limit on 
recovery. To the extent that they are compensatory, they are accidentally so; 
compensation is not the ultimate purpose of expectation damages. Yet 
judges do not seem to use the language of limits and boundaries in justifying 
their decisions. 
The second transparency objection is that judges speak as though 
contracts create affirmative obligations to perform, rather than simply 
marking the defendant’s consent to retaliation in the event of breach.198 
The recourse theory, however, seems to reduce the notion of contract to its 
remedy. The objection here is analogous to that often raised against Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s famous option theory of contract. According to 
Holmes, “The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction 
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.”199 The 
 
 195. SMITH, supra note 53, at 27. 
 196. See, e.g., Marefield Meadows, Inc. v. Lorenz, 427 S.E.2d 363, 366 (Va. 1993) (“The 
remedy for breach of contract is intended to put the injured party in the same position in which 
it would have been had the contract been performed.”). 
 197. See id. 
 198. See, e.g., Pollock v. D.R. Horton, Inc.-Portland, 77 P.3d 1120, 1127 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) 
(noting “each party’s obligation to perform the contract . . . in a way that will effectuate the 
objectively reasonable contractual expectations of the parties”). 
 199. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). Holmes made 
the same point in The Common Law, writing: 
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language used by judges, however, is much richer, implying that contracts—
like promises—ought to be performed.200 On this view, the civil recourse 
theory, like the Holmesian theory, offers too impoverished a view of 
contractual obligation. 
The transparency objection can be met in a number of ways. The first, 
and perhaps least satisfactory answer, is simply to concede that the recourse 
theory does not account for the language used by judges. No theory of a 
practice can account for its every facet—indeed, one of the purposes of a 
theory is to reveal latent or hidden structures, and so by definition an 
illuminating theory will necessarily diverge from our common-sense 
understanding of the law. Even if one acknowledges the inability to account 
for judicial language as a failure, one might believe the advantages gained in 
terms of structural insight justify the sacrifice. One could insist that we must 
account for contractual liability in terms of its actual social function, 
regardless of judicial language. One is necessarily left with the problem of 
judges who seem systematically mistaken about the function of the practice 
that they engage in day in and day out, but this is not so damning a 
conclusion as it first appears. 
Consider the analogy of religion. On some level, everyone believes that 
a large proportion of all religious practitioners are mistaken about the 
import of their own religious practices. But an atheist does not regard the 
implausibility of a large number of people being systematically mistaken 
about their own practices as a sufficient reason to adopt believers’ self-
understanding of prayer. The same, perhaps ironically, is true of believers. 
Those who subscribe to the truth claims of a specific creed will necessarily 
understand other religionists as systemically mistaken about their own 
beliefs. A pious Christian is necessarily an atheist when it comes to the 
ancient Egyptian pantheon, for example. Even those who purport to be 
generally religious without subscribing to any particular creed cannot avoid 
the problem, as they will necessarily regard believers who hold to religious 
truth claims in their particularity as mistaken. This problem cannot be 
avoided by insisting that—unlike judges—religious believers (or 
unbelievers) are, on the whole, misguided or unsophisticated. Only in the 
realm of polemic are all believers (or unbelievers) rubes and Philistines. In 
 
The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes 
the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In every 
case it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfillment has gone by, 
and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. 
Press 1963) (1881); see also Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543 (1903) 
(Holmes, J.) (“When a man commits a tort he incurs by force of the law a liability to damages, 
measured by certain rules. When a man makes a contract he incurs by force of the law a liability 
to damages, unless a certain promised event comes to pass.”). 
 200. See Pollock, 77 P.3d at 1122. 
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the real world, it is difficult to dismiss Augustine or Aquinas as ignoramuses, 
and Nietzsche and Russell stand as ready refutations of the claim that only 
idiots are atheists. 
The point of this analogy is not to take any particular position with 
regard to religious debates. It is simply to point out that very intelligent 
people may be systematically mistaken about the practices in which they are 
involved. This does not mean that the practices themselves are without 
meaning or function—just that the meaning and function are different than 
those ascribed to them by the practitioners. Judges may simply be priests 
who mistakenly believe that their prayers are efficacious or atheists who 
wrongly assume that their blasphemies are intellectually virtuous. Prayer and 
blasphemy have meaning and functions; they just may not be the ones 
ascribed to them by the penitent or the blasphemous. 
The transparency objection can also be met by offering some 
explanation of how the civil recourse theory can be squared with the 
language of judicial opinions. First, the extent of the disjunction between 
legal language and the recourse theory is not as great as the transparency 
objection suggests. Certainly, when judges invoke the penalty doctrine, they 
use the language of limits in discussing expectation damages. Under a 
liquidated-damages clause, a plaintiff is not necessarily entitled to a payment 
that would put him or her in as good a position as if the contract had been 
performed. Parties are free to contract for the payment of some lesser sum, 
as for example when a warranty is coupled with “a money-back guarantee,” 
limiting recovery to the purchase price. In such cases courts explicitly invoke 
the plaintiff’s expectation interest merely as a limit. Likewise, in cases where 
plaintiffs claim damages in excess of their expectation, as for example when 
a plaintiff demands reliance damages beyond those necessary to put him in 
the position he would have been in had the contract been performed, courts 
will explicitly invoke expectation damages as a limit on recovery. Reliance 
damages will be awarded “up to” the amount of the plaintiff’s expectation. 
Finally, any remaining insistence on the compensatory nature of 
expectation damages is belied by the actual behavior of courts. Such 
language is insufficient to keep judges from regularly and knowingly 
awarding plaintiffs less than the value of their full expectation through the 
application of limiting doctrines such as the requirements of certainty, the 
rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, and the like. A theory’s disregard of such 
language can hardly be taken as an affront to judicial self-understanding 
when judges themselves routinely ignore the same language in practice. 
Even accepting the account of judicial language offered above, the 
objection that courts speak of contracts as creating obligations to perform 
remains. Unlike Holmes’s theory, however, the civil recourse theory of 
contract does not reject the notion of such obligations. Holmes noted with 
satisfaction that his “mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of 
those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they 
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can.”201 In contrast, the civil recourse theory need not be less committed to 
the notion of such obligations than the more overtly moralizing approaches. 
Even a promissory theorist who insists that contract law merely reflects the 
morality of promising must acknowledge that the law is incapable of 
enforcing all contractual obligations. In some cases this will be literally 
impossible, and in other cases, the costs of doing so will be prohibitive. 
Those who insist that every contract creates an obligation to perform must 
acknowledge that in some cases those obligations will exist without any legal 
enforcement. The law may still create moral obligations, but the language of 
obligation will not necessarily be an adequate guide to law as a social 
practice. 
A recourse theorist can make similar concessions. There is nothing 
about the civil recourse theory that denies that contracts may create moral 
obligations to perform. The civil recourse theory offered here is agnostic on 
such questions. On the other hand, the civil recourse theory does not seem 
to take the notion of legal obligation to keep a contract any less seriously 
than does a promissory theory that purports to account for our current 
remedial machinery. Such a theory is also necessarily reconciled to a 
disjunction between the language of legal obligation and the reality of legal 
remedy. The civil recourse theory is entirely comfortable with saying that 
one has an obligation to keep a contract, so long as the obligation is 
understood as one where breach gives rise to the right to legitimately 
retaliate against the breaching party. 
A final response to the transparency objection is to insist on the 
distinction between legal language and ordinary moral language. When 
judges explain their decision in a particular contract case, they do not 
purport to provide a justification for contract law in general. Rather, taking 
the law as given, they seek to show how it forms the major premise of an 
argument whose conclusion is that this plaintiff wins or loses. Put another 
way, judges provide reasons for their decisions, but these reasons are legal, 
rather than moral.202 When judges speak of obligations, they refer to legal, 
not moral, obligations.203 Likewise, when they speak of compensating a 
party for a loss, they mean a legal, not a moral, loss.204 Legal arguments thus 
invoke legally normative concepts rather than morally normative concepts. 
To be sure, the fact of legal obligation may be a premise in an argument 
about moral obligation, but when deciding particular cases, judges do not 
make such an argument. Their goal is not to explain why the defendant is or 
is not morally reprehensible; rather, it is to explain why the defendant is or 
is not legally liable. 
 
 201. Holmes, supra note 199, at 462. 
 202. See Oman, supra note 100, at 1493–94. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See id. 
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This does not mean, of course, that legal concepts lack a moral 
justification. It does mean, however, that those moral justifications need not 
rely on a set of moral claims and obligations whose structure mirrors that of 
legal claims and obligations. For example, a body of law might be devoted to 
creating efficient incentives by allocating legal obligations. Once the 
efficiency theory had allocated the obligations, however, judges could speak 
without embarrassment of how a party had a legal duty to perform a 
particular act. The judicial language would sound ex post, even 
deontological, notwithstanding that the ultimate justification for the body of 
law was entirely ex ante and consequentialist. 
Of course, we would still be left with the question of why the courts 
should use the ex post language of duties in deciding their cases, rather than 
the more transparent language of ex ante incentives. The answer is that a 
judge decides a particular case applying preexisting rules ex post, even if the 
rules themselves are justified on ex ante grounds. Given the fact that in 
deciding cases, judges do not justify legal rules, but apply them, the 
preference for ex post language is unsurprising and need not imply 
anything about the underlying moral structure of the law’s justification. The 
fact that judges speak in terms of rights and obligations does not provide an 
adequate response to the civil recourse theory’s account of the purposes of 
contractual liability. Indeed, given the distinction of justification of 
particular outcomes within a body of law and the justification of the body of 
law as a whole, the judicial language of rights and obligations may be 
reconciled with virtually any normative justification of the practice as a 
whole. 
C. THE DOCTRINAL OBJECTION 
The aim of the recourse theory is to present contractual liability as 
embodying in part a commitment to providing disappointed promisees an 
avenue of legitimate recourse against breaching promisors through the 
courts. A successful interpretive approach will both fit and justify current 
contract doctrine.205 Of course, the fit need not be perfect. The common 
law of contracts arose over a half millennia of fits, starts, dead ends, and 
historical accidents, and it is too much to hope that any theory could make 
sense of the entire mass of legal doctrine. One of the tasks of interpretive 
theory is to separate a practice’s central themes from the historical detritus. 
On the other hand, so long as core features of the doctrine remain 
unexplained, it is unlikely that we truly understand the law, unless we are to 
assume that it is nothing more than a set of historical accidents bereft of 
 
 205. See SMITH, supra note 53; cf. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 52 (nesting the 
interpretation of legal concepts within a set of controversial theories about what constitutes law, 
how judges ought to decide cases, and the priority of a particular version of liberal moral 
philosophy). Dworkin is thus an example of interpretive theory, rather than its sine qua non. 
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normative coherence. Accordingly, the failure of a theory to account for a 
major set of doctrines must surely count as a point against it. On first 
inspection, the doctrines surrounding contract formation, especially the 
doctrines of consideration and promissory estoppel, seem to pose major 
problems for the civil recourse theory of contract. But upon closer 
examination, these doctrines pick out obligations where one would expect a 
disappointed promisee to demand satisfaction in the event of breach. 
Admittedly, they do so in an ad hoc manner dictated by the historical 
accidents of the common law; but when viewed from the perspective of the 
civil recourse theory they have a unity of purpose. 
The strongest objection to the claim that contracts consist of consent to 
retaliation in the event of breach is that intent to be legally bound is not an 
element of contract formation under American law.206 A promise becomes 
legally enforceable under American law when it is supported by bargained-
for consideration, or when it induces reasonable reliance.207 There is no 
additional requirement that the parties intend for their commitments to be 
legally enforced.208 This position can be usefully contrasted with English 
law, where intent to be legally bound is at least formally required to form a 
valid contract.209 Likewise, Randy Barnett has argued on normative grounds 
that consent to be legally bound should be the touchstone for contract 
formation.210 Whatever the merits of this proposal, it does not represent 
current law.211 American law attaches liability to a certain class of 
promises—those with consideration or those inducing reasonable reliance—
regardless of the legal intentions of the promisors.212 Put another way, the 
rules regarding contract formation do not seem to pick out the class of 
promises—those where the promisor consents to recourse by the 
promisee—suggested by the civil recourse theory. Accordingly, whatever its 
merits as a normative theory, a recourse theory of contract would seem to 
fail as an interpretive account of the law. 
 
 206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. c (1981). 
 207. See id. §§ 18–19. 
 208. See id. § 17 cmt. c. 
 209. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the strong presumption under 
English law that the parties to a contract intend to be legally bound by forming the same). 
 210. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 110, at 304 (“Therefore, the phrase ‘a 
manifestation of an intention to be legally bound’ neatly captures what a court should seek to 
find before holding that a contractual obligation has been created.” (footnote omitted)). 
 211. Barnett does seem to suggest, however, that the American law is on the cusp of 
formally recognizing such a requirement, which he regards as the best account of current 
doctrine. See RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 811–12 (4th ed. 2008) 
(setting forth “A Hypothetical Alternative to Restatement § 90” hinging on “manifest[ing] an 
intention to be legally bound”). 
 212. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21. 
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It is difficult to find modern contract theorists who are enthusiastic 
supporters of the doctrine of consideration.213 Stephen Smith, for example, 
provided the following tepid endorsement: “[An] examination of the 
consideration rule suggests that no explanation can account for all of its 
various features. But the examination also suggests that it would be wrong to 
conclude (as some have concluded) that the rule is entirely without 
rationale.”214 Charles Fried has been more scathing. “The bargain theory of 
consideration,” he wrote, “not only fails to explain why [the] pattern of 
decisions is just; it does not offer any consistent set of principles from which 
all these decisions would flow.”215 
Nevertheless, the doctrine of consideration answers an important 
practical question. No legal system has ever tried to enforce every promise or 
future commitment.216 So which promises does the law enforce? The 
modern doctrine of consideration provides a simple answer to this question: 
The law will enforce bargained-for promises. One may quarrel about 
whether this choice is justified, but it does provide an apparently simple 
answer to the threshold question. 
Or at least it did to the classical theorists who formulated modern 
contract doctrine at the end of the nineteenth century.217 As has been 
chronicled many times since then, the ambition to have the law of contracts 
pivot on the fulcrum of bargained-for consideration proved a chimera.218 
The limits of the bargain principle can be seen in two contexts. The first is 
contract modification—one cannot bargain with what one has already given 
away. Thus, under the preexisting-duty rule, a performance to which one 
was already obligated under a contract cannot serve as consideration on a 
new promise.219 The result of this rule has been to require both parties to a 
contract to alter their obligations when they want to modify their existing 
contractual obligations.220 Courts were frequently forced to resort to 
creative readings of the facts of cases—finding recessions and altered 
 
 213. Of course, even unloved consideration is not without its partisans. See, e.g., Melvin 
Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1997); Gold, 
supra note 144; Val D. Ricks, The Sophisticated Doctrine of Consideration, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99 
(2000). 
 214. SMITH, supra note 53, at 232. 
 215. FRIED, supra note 106, at 33. 
 216. FARNSWORTH, supra note 159, § 1.5, at 11 (“No legal system has ever been reckless 
enough to make all promises enforceable.”). 
 217. See id. § 2.2, at 47–48 (summarizing the rise of the bargain theory of consideration). 
 218. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 448–54 (1979) 
(discussing the rise and fall of the doctrine of consideration). 
 219. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981). 
 220. See Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902); Stilk v. Myrick, 
(1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (C.P.); 2 Camp. 317. 
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obligations out of thin air—to reach seemingly reasonable results.221 
Eventually, consideration was abandoned—at least by the Uniform 
Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts—as the 
exclusive touchstone for contract modification.222 The second context 
where consideration broke down involved the enforcement of gratuitous 
promises under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In these cases, the 
courts simply abandoned the doctrine of bargained-for consideration all 
together, enforcing promises that induced reasonable and substantial 
reliance.223 
In addition, a number of apparently vestigial transactions from before 
the rise of the bargain theory of consideration continue to be enforced as 
exceptions to the rule. Examples include the enforcement of promises 
under seal, written option contracts for the sale of land that recite 
(ultimately nonexistent) consideration, and the like.224 This patchwork of 
approaches has long frustrated those looking for a clean theory of contract 
formation. For instance, promissory estoppel finds a ready justification in 
the desire to protect promisees from unfair losses caused by detrimental 
reliance.225 But such a rationale cannot be squared with the consideration 
doctrine’s willingness to enforce wholly executory bilateral contracts on 
which there is no reliance of any kind.226 Likewise, arguments can be 
marshaled for the usefulness of a formal device such as a seal—yet since at 
least the early seventeenth century, the common law has enforced informal 
contracts.227 Whatever the apparent contradictions of these doctrines, 
however, it seems clear that none of them hinge on consent to recourse. 
Accordingly, the heart of the law of contract formation seems to stand in 
stark defiance of the civil recourse theory. 
The response to this apparently powerful criticism is that each of the 
various routes by which a promise might become a contract—consideration, 
reliance, and formality—picks out the sort of promises that a person would 
expect to give rise to a legitimate demand for recourse in the event of 
breach. Rather than trying to find individual arguments for consideration, 
formal contracts, and reliance, we can see all of these devices as picking out 
the sort of promises where a promisor might expect a promisee to demand a 
 
 221. See, e.g., Brian Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Brighenti, 405 A.2d 72 (Conn. 1978) (finding a 
new contract supported by valid consideration despite no actual written contract after a change 
in circumstances). 
 222. See U.C.C. § 2-209; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89. 
 223. See Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Ricketts v. Scothorn, 
77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898); Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cnty. Bank of Jamestown, 159 
N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). 
 224. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 95. 
 225. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 139, at 70. 
 226. See id. at 77–78. 
 227. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799 (1941). 
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right of recourse in the event of breach. Hence, bargains give rise to 
contractual liability not because bargains enjoy some special normative 
status, but because as an empirical matter, promisors can be held to expect 
promisees to demand recourse when bargains are breached. On the other 
hand, as an empirical matter, promisors do not expect promisees to demand 
recourse in the event that they breach gratuitous and unrelied-on gift 
promises. Likewise, when someone reasonably relies on the promise of 
another, the promisor may be held to expect that the promisee will demand 
some method of recourse in the event of breach.228 
To put the point more graphically, in the ancient Near East when a 
promisor entered into a covenant, he could expect a demand for recourse if 
he hacked a goat to pieces—not because there is any special moral 
significance to hacking up a goat, but because there was a shared social 
understanding that goat-hacking covenants are the sorts of promises where 
promisees will expect recourse in the event of breach.229 This does not 
mean that hacking up a goat is the only way in which such expectations 
might arise—a heifer, a ram, or a dog seemed to work as well.230 Indeed, 
there was no reason why such an expectation could not arise when no 
animal, of any species, was hacked to pieces.231 The rituals involving the 
 
 228. An analogy may help to illuminate the nature of this claim. Consider the way in which 
the criminal law protects personal property. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 771–81 
(1997) (discussing crimes against personal property). The crime of larceny punishes those who 
take property that is not their own. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2 (1985). The crime of fraud 
punishes those who obtain the property of others through deception. See id. § 223.3. The crime 
of robbery punishes those who obtain property by threatening physical violence. See id. § 222.1. 
The crime of blackmail punishes those who obtain property by threatening others with 
wrongful conduct. See id. § 223.4. We can understand all these crimes in at least two ways. First, 
we might see them as a bundle of essentially unrelated wrongs. Larceny punishes the taking of 
what is not one’s own, fraud punishes lying, robbery punishes the use of threats of violence, and 
blackmail punishes other threats. The apparent unity of these crimes is largely accidental. 
Alternatively, one might say that in each of these cases we are picking out a particular kind of 
wrongful conversion of the property of another. Notice the second approach sees the 
distinction between these various crimes as a matter of convenience and historical accident. 
This rather ad hoc explanation, however, confers the benefit of revealing the latent unity 
between the various crimes. It also avoids some of the problems that a more particularized 
account of the crimes runs into. For example, if fraud is about punishing lies, we are left with 
the problem of accounting for the fact that the law does not punish all lies, but only those used 
to obtain property from another. 
 229. See supra text accompanying notes 1, 9. 
 230. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 231. For example, in the so-called Shechem Covenant, recounted in the final chapter of 
Joshua, the Children of Israel enter into a covenant to serve God and Joshua sets up a stone 
under a tree to memorialize the covenant, explaining that should they breach their obligations, 
the jealous God of Israel will demand vengeance. What was important was not the particular 
formality—dismembered animals or stones under a tree—or even the presence of formality at 
all. What mattered was that parties expected recourse in the event of breach. See Joshua 24:1–28 
(King James) (setting forth the story of the Shechem Covenant); THE NEW JEROME BIBLICAL 
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dismembered livestock just happen to be one of the myriad of situations in 
which such expectations arose.232 
There are at least two objections to the claim that formation doctrines 
pick out consent to recourse as an empirical matter. The first objection is 
that it smuggles an intent to be legally bound back into the theory by 
locating that intent in a social understanding that happens to coincide with 
the doctrinal categories. The second objection is that the claim views the 
doctrine as a set of essentially accidental and ad hoc attempts to get at a 
concept that does not quite seem to be present in the rules. There is some 
truth to both of these objections, but neither ultimately provides a reason 
for rejecting the claim that consideration, promissory estoppel, and other 
formation doctrines pick out promises where promisors expect promisees to 
demand recourse. 
There is a sense in which this first objection is correct, but we must be 
careful about what we mean when we say “an intent to be legally bound.” 
The absence of any requirement to be legally bound can be justified 
precisely because the law seeks to capture a preexisting set of social 
understandings of when commitments give rise to a legitimate expectation 
of recourse in the event of breach. Because the duty arises out of these social 
understandings, however, it is not absolute. If the parties actually have a 
different understanding, that understanding controls.233 For example, even 
though under American law there is no requirement that contracting parties 
intend to be legally bound, if they both agree not to be legally bound, then 
no contract is formed.234 The doctrine seeks to track what it assumes would 
be the parties’ understanding and willingly steps back when their mutually 
expressed understandings diverge from the default position. There is an 
implicit assumption that parties do intend to be legally bound—an 
assumption that the law will abandon in the face of contrary evidence. 
The second objection is that this interpretation of formation doctrines 
views the doctrine as a set of essentially accidental and ad hoc attempts to 
get at a concept that is not quite present in the rules. This is true, and a 
 
COMMENTARY 130–31 (Raymond Brown et al. eds., 1990) (discussing the formalities of the 
Shechem Covenant). 
 232. This interpretation reveals the nature of the error committed by the classical theorists. 
Classical-contract doctrine failed to meet its goal of turning consideration into a necessary 
condition for contractual liability. This failure does not, however, preclude it from serving as a 
sufficient condition. Furthermore, the sufficiency of consideration does not imply that other 
elements cannot be sufficient as well. What matters is not the special moral status of bargains; 
rather, consideration matters because of the socially shared meaning of bargains, a meaning 
that includes an expectation of satisfaction in the event of breach. The same is true of reliance 
and vestigial formalisms like contracts under seal. Nothing about the fact that parties to a 
bargain expect some form of recourse in the event of breach is logically inconsistent with 
similar expectations in other factual situations. 
 233. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981). 
 234. See id. 
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more abstract rule—say, that contracts arise out of consent to retaliation in 
the event of breach, and in the absence of contrary evidence such consent 
will be presumed where the parties could reasonably expect a legitimate 
right of recourse in the event of breach—would better track the justification 
offered by the recourse theory. There are two reasons why the absence of 
such a general rule need not be fatal to the interpretation offered here. 
First, such a general principle would provide courts with little guidance in 
resolving particular cases.235 Rule-of-law values such as predictability and the 
limitation of judicial discretion counsel in favor of rules at a finer level of 
granularity.236 Second, any account of contractual liability must be willing to 
tolerate a certain amount of ad hoc historical accident. To demand a perfect 
fit between theory and institution would set a bar for interpretative theory so 
high as to deprive the project of any meaning. Such a demand would 
effectively amount to an all-or-nothing approach to the normative 
coherence of the law. It would also rob interpretative theory of its 
usefulness, which in part is to identify those portions of the law that fail to fit 
within any plausible justifying theory and are therefore good candidates for 
reform. 
In comparing the interpretive success of theories, we are thus left with 
the need to weigh their comparative coherence. Because the 
interdependence of what is being explained and explanation is inherent in 
interpretive arguments,237 the best that we can hope for is an oscillation 
between good-faith adjustments to our theory and reexamination of the 
explained practice until some reflective equilibrium is reached.238 While the 
account of formation doctrines offered here suggests that they are ad hoc 
and historically contingent attempts to get at a broader class of agreements, 
this account does have the advantage of seeing these doctrines as having a 
certain unity. In contrast, other theories view them in opposition to one 
another, with reliance, for example, representing a tort-like intrusion into 
the bargain-centered world of contract.239 Finally, in contrast to some other 
theories, the account offered here does not require the wholesale rejection 
 
 235. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 138–40 (William 
Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1997) (discussing the comparative advantages of using rules 
versus standards); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 98 (Tony Honoré & Joseph Raz 
eds., 1991) (“If . . . we see rules not so much as implements for achieving predictability but as 
devices for the allocation of power, then it is far from clear that granting the power to a rule-
applier to determine whether following the rule is on the balance of reasons desirable on this 
occasion is necessarily desirable.”). 
 236. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 110–13 (rev. ed. 1969). 
 237. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 267 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. 
Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 2004) (discussing the hermeneutic circle). 
 238. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42–45 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the idea of 
reflective equilibrium). 
 239. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95–98 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d 
ed. 1995). 
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of formation doctrines. For example, a promissory theory has a difficult time 
explaining why some promises should fail to give rise to contracts at all.240 
After all, if one has a moral obligation to keep one’s promises, the State’s 
obligation to enforce seems odd—even perverse—because it allows some 
promise breakers to escape legal sanction entirely.241 In contrast, the 
account offered here renders formation doctrines meaningful if historically 
contingent and idiosyncratic. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article began with the bloody covenant rituals of the Bible and 
Homer. The agreement between Priam and Agamemnon recounted in The 
Iliad ultimately failed. The attempt to limit war through cooperation broke 
down, fighting resumed, and after the sack of Troy, Agamemnon returned 
to Argos. In his Oresteia trilogy,242 Aeschylus continues the story, recounting 
how Agamemnon’s wife Clytaemnestra murdered him in revenge for his 
earlier sacrifice of their daughter. Clytaemnestra, in turn, was killed by her 
son Orestes in revenge for the murder of his father. In the final play of the 
trilogy, Orestes, pursued by the Furies, a vengeful band of outraged 
demigods, flees to Athens, throwing himself on the mercy of the goddess 
Athena. The Furies, embodying vengeance, feud, and outraged honor, 
demand the murderer. Orestes’s patron, the god Apollo, calls for the 
summary expulsion of the Furies from the city, dismissing them as nothing 
more than agents of senseless violence: 
Go where heads are severed, eyes gouged out, 
where Justice and bloody slaughter are the same . . . 
castrations, wasted seed, young men’s glories butchered, 
extremities maimed, and huge stones at the chest, 
and victims wail for pity— 
spikes inching up the spine, torsos stuck on spikes.243 
One might say that Apollo wishes to relegate the Furies to a world where life 
is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”244 
Athena’s response, however, is more measured. She submits Orestes to 
the judgment of the Athenian court, allowing the Furies to make the case for 
his punishment. The jury is hung, and Athena reluctantly casts the final vote 
for acquittal on the grounds that Clytaemnestra’s crimes justified Orestes’s 
 
 240. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 106, at 39 (arguing that the doctrine of consideration 
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 241. See Shiffrin, supra note 117, at 710–11. 
 242. I am grateful to Josh Chafetz for bringing the connection between Aeschylus’s Oresteia 
and civil recourse to my attention. Any errors in interpretation, of course, remain mine. 
 243. AESCHYLUS, The Eumenides, in THE ORESTEIA 227, 239 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin 
Books 1984) (c. 458 B.C.E.) (lines 183–88). 
 244. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 89. 
A3 - OMAN.DOC 12/15/2010  9:24 PM 
2011] CONSENT TO RETALIATION 579 
matricide, enraging the Furies. Their leader insists to Athena that by 
supplanting vengeance with adjudication, “you have ridden down the 
ancient laws, wrenched them from my grasp.”245 Athena, however, refuses to 
cast the Furies from the city. Instead, she invites them to take a hallowed 
place buried beneath its foundations, an offer the Furies ultimately accept. 
Athena tells the citizens of her city: 
Neither anarchy nor tyranny, my people. 
Worship the Mean, I urge you, 
shore it up with reverence and never 
banish terror from the gates, not outright.246 
The title of the final play is The Eumenides, which refers to the 
transformation of the Furies—literally, the “kindly ones.” In the final speech 
of the play, the women of the city, acting as chorus, sing their praises: 
You great good Furies, bless the land with kindly hearts, 
you Awesome Spirits, come—exult in the blazing torch, 
exult in our fires, journey on.247 
The civil recourse theory of contractual liability rests on a sensibility 
similar to that put forward by Aeschylus. The earliest covenant rituals 
consisted of consent to violent retaliation in the event of breach. In effect, 
the parties invited the Furies into their relationship in the hope of creating 
trust sufficient for cooperation. It was a dangerous expedient, one that 
resulted in a fragile cooperation prone to violent breakdown. Hobbes, 
following Aeschylus’s Apollo, insisted that the Furies must be driven from 
the community by an omnipotent Leviathan. To the extent that modern 
theories of contract focus their attention exclusively on the way that the law, 
as a third party, enforces agreements, they rest on a similar sensibility. The 
common law took a different course. Rather than eliminating private 
retaliation, the common law tamed and limited it. The Furies, however, 
remain buried deep within the structure of contractual liability. Damage 
measures act less as fines or entitlements to compensation than as limits on 
private retaliation. Indeed, inherent in the notion of money damages is itself 
the notion of a limit on retaliation that eliminates the possibility of personal 
violence. Perhaps most strikingly, contract law does not enforce contracts 
per se; rather, it empowers disappointed promisees to act against breaching 
promisors through the courts. 
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